Benefits of Pure Linear Reward Distribution

in curation •  8 years ago  (edited)

I'm now all for pure linear reward distribution, both for content rewards and curation rewards.

1. Current Distribution Curve: Superlinear

  • People hesitate voting for good content because it is "too late" to get cool rewards, due to early-voting bonus (aka late-voting penalty)

  • People hesitate voting for good content because it is "too early" to get cool rewards, due to reverse auction mechanism

  • Bots have huge advantages on voting on "right" contents at "right" time (maximize their returns by "robbing" from other voters)

  • Complexity: hard to explain to casual users

  • Authors got voted by piling whales earn much more than their percentage of votes (stake weighted) received

  • Whales earn much more than their percentage of votes contributed

  • Casual voters got the most penalty due to reverse auction and follow-voting

  • Content value distribution is distorted.

2. Proposed Distribution Curve in 0.17

  • Whales still have advantages, although less than before
  • People still hesitate voting
  • Bots still have big advantages
  • Still hard to understand

3. Pure Linear Distribution

  • Authors earn rewards correlative to votes they received (stake weighted, upvotes minus downvotes)

  • Voters earn rewards correlative to votes they contributed (minus those be downvoted)

  • No penalty nor bonus, no matter when you vote. Casual voters will feel good and enjoy voting.

  • Easy to understand

  • People don't need to predict how others will vote, so content value distribution will be organic

  • Bots have less advantages, although they'll still vote on contents with best return, they won't be able to rob from other voters

//Edit:

4. Things that are non-issues

  • Minnows earn zero curation reward: it's natural, because minnows contribute few influences by stake-weighted voting; but minnows can contribute more by posting / commenting.
  • Nobody will downvote bad contents: there are already volunteers now, working with no return, or be compensated outside the system.
  • Abusers will downvote good contents: with a linear algorithm, abusers can not do more harm than the stake they have.
  • Small SP holders will vote for themselves, "mining dust": no matter how small stakes they hold, they're their stakes, they have a say. Worst case, they won't earn more than they deserve with a linear algorithm. Still, good people will downvote if they upvote bad contents.

//Edit 2:
[More things that are non-issues]

  • People will pile on voting for already popular contents: this is why popular contents are popular. With a linear algorithm, there will be no extra benefit for both the voter and the author. When a popular content is overvalued it will be downvoted, so it's not guaranteed that the voters will earn more rewards by voting on it.
  • No incentive for people who found popular contents early: people will feel good when being shown as the first N voter. We could also set funds off-chain to reward these people, or delegate more SP to them so they'll earn more curation rewards in the future.

//Edit 3:

5. Differences between Linear Reward Distribution and Pure Tipping

  • People are forced to tip. So people will make judgement on targets, although perhaps it's random targeted, or voting for a list of authors/tags, or following others, or by content analyse, there are efforts involved. As long as they can never do more harm than their stake weight, IMHO it's natural and positive. In a pure tipping system, people can opt out by not tipping at all, which encourages false negative (good contents may be undervalued).
  • Downvotes. Pure tipping system doesn't have downvotes, so it's more possible to do self-tipping, which encourages false positive (bad contents may be overvalued).
  • Stake based and limited voting power. So one player's influence is limited, less possible to manipulate the trending page, so fairer IMHO.
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I believe strongly in simplicity and elegance. Almost every time in every market throughout history, the simple and convenient product has won the mass market share over the complex one; even if the latter did offer more powerful solutions.

You are absolutely right that people hesitate before voting because too many rules and controls involved. It's just no fun voting anymore, which is completely antithetical to the point of a social network. What was meant to be a game has become a chore few are interested in. This is why bots are effective on Steem - they never get frustrated.

I'm all for a completely simplified, linear voting and rewards system. As I see it, this will make voting much more fun for a vast number of users; effectively drowning out the influence of abusers.

It'll also drive up demand for Steem. Even with the new reward curve, it heavily penalizes people with a low stake. By making it linear, it'll incentivize powering up to small amounts. Very few will be willing to invest 100 MV ($5000), but many millions may be willing to buy up a small 1MV stake and give it a shot. Lured by a simple and fun game, they might want to buy up some more. Today, they'll just see their small stake has zero impact and give up. By lowering the barrier to entry, it'll open up demand for Steem to a whole wide range of users. Let's face it - Steem is not a Giffen good.

This will be controversial, but I'll say it anyway - I'd also like to see Downvotes being accepted. It's unhealthy - morbid, even - that there's only positive opinion allowed here. A negative opinion is valuable, if not essential, to any healthy community and society. In fact, I'd even say that downvoters should be rewarded the same as upvoters, knowing full well that had they upvoted, everyone including their own rewards would be higher.

By opening up the system to the masses, the abuse will be drowned out. Besides, if bots and abusers want to buy thousands of dollars worth of Steem to abuse the system, ultimately they have increased the price of Steem and bought the right to do so. Their abuse can easily be countervoted by the community at large, and no one will complain about the price rise they cause.

The only thing I'd like to see retained is the voting power drain, and penalize bots or humans who spam vote. That does not affect casual curators at all.

Well said.

This will be controversial, but I'll say it anyway - I'd also like to see Downvotes being accepted. It's unhealthy - morbid, even - that there's only positive opinion allowed here. A negative opinion is valuable, if not essential, to any healthy community and society. In fact, I'd even say that downvoters should be rewarded the same as upvoters, knowing full well that had they upvoted, everyone including their own rewards would be higher.

I have thought about this as well. And I agree that "fair" downvotes should be encouraged. IMHO it's hard to be implemented on the blockchain without being gamed, so perhaps we can do it off-chain. That said, we can set a fund for downvoters, and manually reward the ones who cast "best" downvotes, like steemcleaners and etc. Just think out loud..

In a truly free market, all downvotes are fair just as all upvotes are fair. If you disagree with a downvote, you can upvote the post just like you can counter an upvote with a downvote. This will keep all rewards in check, accurately reflect the community's opinion and also stimulate demand for Steem.

That said, I totally agree that the community has not matured enough and in the end will cause a lot of negative sentiment if there were many downvote abusers etc. So maybe keeping it off-chain is the best approach in the short term.

I don't have a solution, but I'd like to see the community gradually embrace the idea of downvotes as being healthy for the network in general.

Good point.
Perhaps downvotes also split the same curation rewards linearly? I'm not sure if it's a good idea. Main concerns:

  • downvoters may get too much, in case of abusing downvoters
  • downvoters may get too little, in case when payout of a bad post be downvoted to zero
  • downvoters may get too much, in case when someone get rewarded by downvoting bad posts written by his own sock puppets

Like I mentioned earlier, there's an inherent incentive to upvoting instead of downvoting - you and everyone else will get greater curation rewards if you upvote instead of downvote. Of course, that won't stop abusers or schadenfreude enthusiasts, very true.

downvoters may get too much, in case of abusing downvoters

This is definitely a problem, can't really think of a solution other than countering or vote negation for abusive voters. Thing is, even without a reward, abusers will continue to abuse as we see today. I'd also like to point out that upvotes can be abused just as much as downvotes, and ends up costing the reward pool more to boot. So maybe fixing abusive voting requires a different system...

downvoters may get too little, in case when payout of a bad post be downvoted to zero

If a downvoter so strongly disapproves of a post, they'll be happy to bring it down to zero and give up their own rewards. If not, they will leave it be - if the rewards are close to being zero, we can be rest assured it wasn't "over-rewarded" anyway.

downvoters may get too much, in case when someone get rewarded by downvoting bad posts written by his own sock puppets

Not sure if I understand this correctly, but I don't think this is an issue; they stand to lose much more in author rewards by downvoting sock puppets than they would be gaining in downvote rewards. Besides, by upvoting instead they'd both gain greater author rewards and curation rewards.

Just thinking out loud, there's probably no need for a downvote reward, but good discussion :)

I just believe expressing a negative opinion is required for any healthy society and thus downvotes should be accepted by the community. Anyhow, to get back on topic, one thing's for sure - either there should be a linear downvote reward or none at all. Having a different reward system will add more complexity which we are trying to get rid of here.

Curation rewards for downvoting makes so sense since you are removing value from the post or maybe you were refering to something else?
I think curation rewards should just be removed: I'm not the only one apparently
Dan said

I'm in favor of the new curve and eliminating curation rewards

These rewards are the source of a lot of problems. The argument for keeping them is that investors won't have any incentives to buy steem power. This is incorrect. The value of the platform will be a lot higher in the eyes of investors if curation rewards are removed, no more bots, quality content, fairer distribution, less greed mentality, more appealing for other website to integrate, more comment voting, less confusing for newbies, more engagement,etc..all of these will make the platform a lot more valuable than it is now.
Special benefits could also be given to users who refrain from voting so investors can make extra passive income but like I said their passive income is the increase of the value of steem.

Great points and a great exchange here!

Not sure whether to up vote or down vote though ... 😉

What about, since you get curation rewards for upvotes, you get curation charges, that scale downwards the more downvoted. The cost of downvoting is declining part of your curation rewards, therefore. This would diminish the incentive for wanton downvoting, just as you have a decaying vote power, this vote power decay should be equally scaled whether you up or downvote, so not only do you consume vote power downvoting you also get charged a curation charge.

You would then only do it if you think the greater good is served because it would personally cost you a little to do it. This cost would be higher the less other downvotes, in other words, if a lot of people think there is a problem, the cost for all of them will be lowered because this opinion is 'trending'.

Honestly am not that interested in the nitty gritty of voting, and the forum, I just think it should be optimised and economical as a cost to the network to help establish reputation. But I support anything that helps lower the cost of the network and improves its understandability for new users.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

If upvotes get curation rewards then maybe downvotes can get curation charges :) This disincentivises overuse of this, and shifts its use more towards negating clique-voting.

Yes, and invert the sense of the scaling of the share of the curation charges. The most accurate downvotes get charged the least.

I am not really up for making a post about this, I think that the curves for reward distribution become irrelevant when Steem's value goes up instead of down. Which may mean @abit's idea of a flat distribution may be superior, in the sense that it reduces complexity, which lowers administrative cost, leaving more for rewards. We just have to have a Steem asset that tends towards being deflationary, rather than as it is now, distinctly inflationary.

Great exchange guys. I think the inherent risk that comes with downvoting are enough of a disincentive against downvoting abuse.

Now that's an interesting idea! 😄 Idea for next post maybe?

I do like the steemcleaners idea, but it also feels like something that could snowball into a big Steem-Guild-Style disaster. But maybe that's just the way of things around here.

the simple and convenient product has won the mass market share over the complex one

Steem needs a Steve Jobs to make it sexy. If this is not taken seriously, it will be MySpaced.

I'm probably ok with linear author rewards. The self-voting-trash option will become an issue; it's hard to tell how big of an issue until we try it and then analyze the outcome.

However, linear curator rewards (along with linear author rewards) would be very strange and I'd argue would be a terrible idea. Linear curator rewards mean that every vote is rewarded exactly the same, no matter who it votes for or when it votes. Strategically, this would be exactly equivalent to having no curation rewards, except that we'd be paying people for the pleasure of casting random votes. A totally-random voting strategy would pay exactly as much as one which votes for the best posts.

If you have superlinear author rewards, then this problem goes away. If you have sublinear curation rewards, this problem goes away. But you need one or the other.

On the topic of the reverse auction, I'm a big proponent of the reverse auction because it creates a situation where we don't waste curation funds paying rewards for obvious votes. I hold that we don't need to pay curation rewards for votes for someone like @krnl or @ats-david, because everybody knows (including any properly-trained machine) that those posts are going to trend. No incentive for discovery needed.

I don't know how you implement these things in a way that makes sense to average users. Clearly, the current system is totally misunderstood and there's no documentation for it anyway. But the system is built the way it's built for some important reasons that (I believe) trump simplicity.

However, linear curator rewards (along with linear author rewards) would be very strange and I'd argue would be a terrible idea. Linear curator rewards mean that every vote is rewarded exactly the same, no matter who it votes for or when it votes. Strategically, this would be exactly equivalent to having no curation rewards, except that we'd be paying people for the pleasure of casting random votes. A totally-random voting strategy would pay exactly as much as one which votes for the best posts.

As I replied to another comment, due to downvoting, the best for-profit voting strategy would be voting for contents with potential lowest downvoting rate, rather than random posts or the posts with highest pending payout. So there should be work done for that. Bots will still have advantages, but not as huge as they have now.

Casual users and average for-profit voters will open the website or an app, vote for their friends or trending posts, earn their returns. IMHO it's natural, the least cognitive load, so it's the key to mass adoption.

On the topic of the reverse auction, I'm a big proponent of the reverse auction because it creates a situation where we don't waste curation funds paying rewards for obvious votes. I hold that we don't need to pay curation rewards for votes for someone like @krnl or @ats-david, because everybody knows (including any properly-trained machine) that those posts are going to trend. No incentive for discovery needed.

In a natural world, people vote for them because people like them or their contents. But currently many people vote for them because hope to earn more rewards. So, value distribution is distorted. False positives. The root reason is the non-linear curves. Try to fix it by adding another penalty is not the best solution IMHO. Linear distribution solves this issue perfectly. Just my opinion though.

Thanks for expressing your opinions. Although I don't agree about some of them. Looking forward to more discussions.

I'll reply later when have time.

Very valuable inputs. Thanks. I'll be checking back for @abit's answer.

I'm neutral on this vs. the current hf17 proposal. In principle, I think it should be one share/one vote, so I've got a natural preference for linear, but as long as the rules are transparent, there's a good reason for it, and the imbalance isn't too severe, I don't object to other proposals. There is a lot of merit in the points you make.

As I noted in a comment on one of @krnel's posts yesterday, I'm starting to think that the steemit community needs to step back from the details of all these tensions and begin thinking about governance and process. How do we make decisions like this as a community (hopefully without flooding the trending page with squabbling that drives away potential new users)?

One idea that came to mind is to establish an online holacracy, although I'm the first to admit I don't know much about what that means yet, so there might be a better solution.

This is great. I am going to have to resteem this. I especially like the part about getting rid of the time factor when doling out curation rewards. Why should we have to vote at a specific time to maximize our reward? That just doesn't make all that much sense. Rewards should be directly related to a voters stake.

I love complex things because complexity fascinates me, but I am far from an average user and the cognitive overload involved in voting currently is way to high...

There has to be a simpler way and I will support any consensus proposal that makes things simpler for humans and does not favor bots.

I agree. Personally I love complex things too.

Let's use a curve that is a 42nd-order differential equation's impulse response, then (as long as somebody else is writing the voter's manual).

I do as well. None of us are really good at finding simple solutions that would gain mass appeal.

Thanks for this, love the brevity and straightforward approach. It looks good, but...

I'm beginning to think what we need are actual simulations of this kind of thing, it just seems too complex, too many possible side effects. I like the pros of your idea here but don't think the cons are represented enough. We need hard data.

Perhaps it would be an idea to do a test branch. It could either be run with automated bots and / or people doing it to help out, or even "replay" some live data onto it to see how it would pan out in a different way.

I'm seeing a lot of proposals, many of which are good. It's very hard to know if they would work though just by running it in your head. I think only the very very smart can do that well, I wouldn't count myself among them 😅

If I understood correctly, you mean to calculate payout distribution with current data but with new rules. I see one issue here: different rules introduce different behaviors, so the result of simulation would be inaccurate even probably far from real effects, which makes the simulation less valuable.

By the way, perhaps it's good to try this with comment reward pool first.

calculate payout distribution with current data

Yep, that is why it was my third choice. Much better would be the first two, using some bots and / or real people doing it just to help out.

In fact it could be a blind test where participants don't know which proposal has been implemented in the sandbox. Perhaps everyone can be rewarded for participating, since the actual rewards in the sandbox would not be real.

Simulation has its value. But without real money involved, the results are usually inaccurate (I don't know how far it will be though). You'll know the difference if you've ever played with market simulators, for example stock markets or currency markets or futures.

But without real money involved, the results are usually inaccurate

I agree with you.

Agreed. I started work on a steem voting simulator here: https://github.com/biophil/steem-simulator

But I ran into other things that needed doing and it stalled a bit... But I love the idea of having a sandbox where we could try these things before they're baked into the code.

I think it should be an official steem project, but we can kickstart in the wild if there's interest.

Replay simulations with altered rules would be a very cool way to test the results, just for how the distribution would change, no interest in what transfers and conversions are then done afterwards. They wouldn't take long either, on a ramdisk the whole chain could be custom-replayed with an altered ruleset and then the RPC queries can be then used to dig out the data of the results.

Interesting, so if I follow you, you are suggesting hacking the steemd source and making a kind of test node? If so that would be very handy for analysing the results because it could be connected to in the same way as normal for API access, then just run usual analytics tools.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

Yup. It would be a custom plugin that can have the other plugins as children, basically, and it would have to not attempt to sync after replay, it would just let you inspect a freeze-frame up to a time to analyse the effects of changes in the algorithm. The replay would naturally change the witness-parts of the transactions. I don't know exactly what things like interest payment transactions look like, but I believe that the witness signs the transaction, which it can do because it has been delegated in the election and selected for the timeslot, thus it signs on behalf of all their voters.

So in other words, a simulator like this would have to ignore the calculations and witness transactions and use the witness plugin to generate the witness allocation parts based on the altered rulesets. You could narrow the filter to whatever way you want to for your analytical purpose.

Nice, as a plugin would be elegant. But it would still require the proposed changes to steemd if I'm not mistaken (for example, "linear reward distribution, both for content rewards and curation rewards" as in the proposal of this post).

I don't know if it's something you have time to work on but I'd be willing to contribute to a project like this. Perhaps a proposal post is required

yeah, it's a matter of writing a plugin that does replay but ignores the witness created transactions (interest payments, reward payments) and deploys a witness plugin to create them (and remake the blocks). Then, like you say, the changes have to be in the witness plugin code (the business logic, as they call it). The other aspect is that the node has to be autarkic, simply the witness plugin gets every single block to process where in the network this is distributed.

Someone else was already talking about simulator plugins and starting development on them. It will be a boon for the successful choice of the best algorithm when new hardforks are coming up, not quite so much trial and error on the users as it stands now.

Beta tag is correct, because we have to be guinea pigs to put up with some really dumb shit happening for a while so we can say 'yes, that was dumb shit'. A simulator would make it more engineering. Trading bots also have replay functions that respond to historical data as though it is realtime and applying the heuristic to make trading decisions, to test a new model. We need the same thing and it will be less error and more trial.

Thanks for this explanation, and the comparisons of possible approaches.

As a blogger/content creator and relative newbie, the thing that keeps poking at my mind is the whole bot vs human imbalance. Yes, bots definitely have their place... whether they are utilities like @cheetah or something else. But as a writer I look at this and see that my post has (for example) 200 votes and 23 views. Now, I realize this is more a psychological thing than a functional one... but I create content for people to enjoy it, interact with it, learn from it or whatever. A bot ping doesn't really tell me anything because most bots are not "smart." They can tell the difference between "War & Peace" and a poorly constructed joke.

Maybe that has little impact in the short term, but in the long term I scratch my head and wonder "why should I BOTHER" to create something worthwhile. OK, so "worthwhile" may be subjective, but in the long term a potential new user/investor is going to see some old content and base their decision to join/not join Steemit on whether they are looking at something "good" or a pile of garbage.

Well, that kind of curation (pushing quality content to highest visibility) requires humans, not bots... which is a longwinded way of asking "what about addressing the relative weight/import of a bot upvote vs. an upvote by a real human who looked at a piece of content, decided "this is good," upvoted and even left a comment, stimulating discussion. Those two surely don't have the same "value," in the greater scheme of things?

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

Just to understand the exact terms of "pure linear reward distribution": Does this mean a vote is equal in power for anyone voting? ie not a weighted vote against steem power / MVEST? Does it also imply the 30 minute rule is abandoned?

When still the vote is weighted with users steem power / MVEST, the vote of a user with a high MVEST, is more powerful and will have more return over a vote from a user with a low MVEST. This will still result in challenges for newbies. Since the platform needs to grow by onboarding new users and keep those users active on the platform, as well as turning around many of the existing inactive / passive users into active users, I would propose a voting system in which each individual has a equal vote regardless of the MVEST a user has. If such even distribution is not acceptable, some influence curve could be introduced lowering the influence of a user with high MVEST and increasing the influence of a user with low MVEST per unit of share / MVEST; this to give the enormous amount of low MVEST holders a chance to influence, and with that give them the idea they CAN make a difference and therefore keep them engaged more.

I compare my proposal to how in the EU the participating countries do have their vote in EU legislations; Each country regardless of its economic size, or its number of residents, have equal power in EU legislations. This means that a country such as Denmark, Belgium or The Netherlands has equal power as a country such as Germany or Italy. There are reasons why this is not liked, but it makes sure the smaller countries are willing to be part of the EU. Otherwise the EU would not have happened as it is. In Steemit terms, each user can be the equivalent to an EU country, where Steemit is the EU itself.

Another analogy can be made to the voting system for national and local government (in democratic countries) in which each person eligible to vote, has an equal weighted vote, regardless what that person is contributing to the economy, or what stake it has in the country in terms of financials, or even time a person contributes to the common good of society. Someone not working and maybe even taking money from the state from the general pot of money the government has, has an equal vote to someone who contributes millions of Euro's to the government by paying his income and/or corporate taxes. That is in the end what real democracy is IMHO.

There could also be a system introduced in which the community can (temporary) blacklist user from voting. This maybe prone to miss use, but if the bar is set high, eg 70% of the (active) community is voting YES to temporary bar someone from voting, then it'll be hard for individuals to miss use such system since it needs to convince a lot of people. Of course I bank on the fact that the majority of the people vote based on his/her common sense.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

Yes my proposal is still stake weighted. It's just like a company, where same stake has same weight in decision making.

Sure it's fairer if everyone have same weight, but the blockchain only knows accounts but not real identity, so it's possible to be Sybil attacked. For example @sigmajin has 8000 accounts, some miners have hundreds or thousands as well. A whale can easily create thousands of acccounts. The community-blacklisting feature you mentioned is also related to Sybil attacks.

Could and should the system not be build with identity confirmation? The system requires a mobile number for registration, which essentually means that the user is providing already some sort of verifiable identity. Of course, a user can get a prepaid mobile number to stay anonymous.

It is maybe super nice to be able to stay anonymous, but the reality is that we are not anonymous. Even here on Steemit. People get verification done through eg SteemVerify, ID needs to be given when wanting the ability to buy Steem with FIAT currencies. Also we may post on Facebook and other social media.

In addition, systems can be put in place to do behavioural analyses and identify people with multiple accounts, even when the users are anonymous. This is more and more implemented in mobile networks to identify SMS wholesalers using backdoors with low or zero costs to the SMS. Of course, not all fraud is detected and blocked, but the systems are getting better and better.

Mobile numbers can be fake. One can have many numbers. Also as you said it has benefits to allow people to stay anonymous, although many people don't care about being verified. Try to solve this issue in this way is not the highest priority of a blockchain, nor we have any advantage in this area.

I know mobile numbers can be fake. That is why I mentioned the SMS case using backdoors to send free messages for which European mobile operators ask multiple cents per SMS through the normal routes. Those SMS senders using backdoors are also using big farms of SIM cards, ie many mobile numbers. Intelligent systems in the network identifying the numbers operated by a single SMS sender through behavioural analyses. Most of these backdoor SMs senders are identified and blocked. Of course, once detected they may implement a different behaviour. But, the net result is that many of those SMS senders using the illegal backdoors are stopping there activities after some time; since it just becomes to complex and time consuming for them. Therefore the net result is less abuse of the networks. I really think this will also be the case within Steemit / Steem and similar frameworks and platforms when behavioural analyses is introduced to fight against multiple accounts controlled by the same user / group of users. In the end, I really believe true democracy will be necesary for platforms like Steemit to have an impact in our world as we know it. It could be that today it maybe to early to inplement what I'm bringing forward, but I truly hope such approach is considered as a possibility and the search is on how to actually implement, now or sometime in the future. Otherwise we always will be in worlds with the majority of the power at a few people which causes all the troubles we are facing in the world.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

The fraud on mobile networks I'm talking about in previous messages above is called SIM Box Fraud. Some links to interesting articles about this:

Leading companies providing solutions to detect and block this type of fraud are:

In essence the solutions are based on protocol parameter analyses, pattern recognition and (self)learning algorithms.

Thanks for the info.

We need to get as close as possible to linear. And maybe going all the way is the right thing. I'm open to anything that's close and will trust you smart guys on the details. @abit Thanks for your leadership on this.

Would it be possible to think of a weighting of vote, view and reply where vote is worth 60%, views 20% and replys 20% or any other proportion?

Views are not on the blockchain, so can't be used in the formula.
Voters are far more than replies, it's natural. If number of replies is in the formula, spamming is encouraged, so it's easy to be gamed.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

No penalty nor bonus, no matter when you vote. Casual voters will feel good and enjoy voting.

the problem with pure linear distribution for curation rewards is that it creates a huge incentive to vote for posts that are already the most popular.

That is to say, my best strategy is to camp out on the trending page and vote for top trending posts. If i get 10X more curation reward for voting on the post with $100 on it than i do for voting on the post with $10 on it, why would i ever vote for the $10 post? I will get guaranteed max curation rewards by voting only on the posts that already have the highest payout.

Under the current system, my incentive to vote on the $10 post is that it might eventually become a $100 post, and ill get more reward for voting while its only valued at $10. Under a pure linear system, i can just wait and see if its worth $100 eventually and cast my vote then.

it creates a huge incentive to vote for posts that are already the most popular.

With linear curation rewards plus linear content rewards, it's no incentive to vote for popular contents, nor disincentives though. You get same return no matter vote for what, the only factor is downvotes cast by others. Some people will downvote "overvalued" popular contents, so a better return is not guaranteed.

So the optimal strategy would be to vote for posts in the final seconds before they pay out, to minimize the chances of downvotes. That doesn't seem like something I'd want to incentivize.

Actually, the optimal strategy would be to cast a random downvote for every random upvote. That way you'd be pushing more rewards onto the posts that you're voting.

Good point. I have thought of this as well.

There is a review period in current system. During this period, post can only be downvoted. However, for better user experience (people who wants to upvote can upvote), it's only a few minutes now, IMHO it's too short. So I think we can set it longer, for example, one day, so good people have enough time to review and downvote overvalued contents. In regards to the user experience part, it's doable to just let people upvote, and only record the upvote, don't impact the payout value nor voting power.

Actually, the optimal strategy would be to cast a random downvote for every random upvote. That way you'd be pushing more rewards onto the posts that you're voting.

I don't understand this. In my proposal downvotes will reduce total payout of a post. How can you get more rewards by doing so? If you cast a upvote and a same weighted downvote on same post, you won't increase total payout of the post, but will just inflate others' influence, so this strategy would be less profitable than upvoting good contents only.

I don't understand this.

Yeah, after thinking about it more, I now think I was wrong on that. :) You'd get more for your upvote somewhere else.

My thought was that I'd upvote Post A and downvote Post B to shift some of the rewards from B to A. But since there are many many posts in the world, the downvote wouldn't be an efficient use of voting power.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

You get same return no matter vote for what, the only factor is downvotes cast by others.

this is true.

The pure-linear approach work best in the situation where the community members are actively flagging those bad-quality posts. In a upvote-dominated system, where only a few minority doing policing job, then the flat reward-curve will just incentivize people to cast random votes.

so, linear-approach would work better if we could have a mechanism to compensate the down-voters. for e.g. maybe we could revise their voting power if a down-votes surpass some threshold (say, >50% of upvotes) so at least they wont be penalized on their voting power by doing good flagging job... it would be best if could come out with some rewarding scheme.

Good point. But keep in mind that downvotes can be abused as well, so hard to do the incentives right. As of now, I strongly tend to use an off-chain rewarding/compensating mechanism.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

ok, i think i understand what youre saying now. and yeah youre right, with that you get a flat-fee curation reward (minus downvotes)... its exactly like always being the first to vote on something thats already after the 30 minute mark... you get a quarter of the value back that you added.

The only thing is, why bother to put any thought into your vote at all at that point.... why not just cast 40 random votes every 24 hours. If we're giving everyone the same reward regardless of the quality of their curation, why not simply build it into the system as SP incentives and have people vote for free.

It's still organic, right?
If you vote manually, at least you see the titles. When you saw the titles, you made judgement.
If you vote with a bot, either you follow authors or tags, or follow other voters, or judge by analyzing the contents, you've done your work/judgement.
If you make bad decisions, others will downvote, so you'll earn less.
Voting on popular contents and making them more popular is not fault. Actually it's why they're popular.

Voting on popular contents and making them more popular is not fault. Actually it's why they're popular.

this is a good point

Seems like @abit won you over here! ☺️Is there anything you can think of that might be against this proposal? Just for completeness, I'm scratching my own head 🤔

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

nesting

Is there anything you can think of that might be against this proposal?

Im kind of a cheap date when it comes to linearity. I'm not completely without reservation on making curation performance blind, but there doesnt seem to be an obvious GT problem with it...

There is the old argument that in a truly linear system, everyone will just vote for themselves, but IDK as i necessarily agree that this will happen. ANd as I point out in my 'opponent of the exponent' post, it seems likely that existing steemit institutions can handle potential abuse.

Voting on popular contents and making them more popular is not fault. Actually it's why they're popular.

But if every vote pays out the same, why pay?

But if every vote pays out the same, why pay?

says the guy who makes more than everyone else

but yeah, this is my only beef with this idea. I think you need at least some front weighting to make people actually try.... though i think the current system has way too much.

"Making a content more popular" is the value later upvoters contributed, why not pay? They evaluate the results done by earlier voters, and confirm it by follow voting, done their work well.

Why can't there be an easy way to tell the community the best times to vote for good content? I have no idea how these whales are cheating the system and draining the pool.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

Firstly, to be clear, whales are not cheating but playing by the (bad-designed) rule. Blame the rule, but not the people.
Secondly, for me, "the best time to vote" should be as simple as "when you read a post and think it's good". (Edit: the point is you shouldn't be punished when doing so)

Blame the rule, but not the people.

theyre not really. And there isnt really a magic time.

Because author rewards are superlinear, and curation rewards are just a part of author rewards, that means that in order for there to be any significant curation rewards at all, a whale needs to vote for the post in question. And because there's a huge bonus for early voters over later voters, that means that to get a share you can't get in after the whale.

So who can vote on a post and be sure a whale will vote on the post? Well, a whale. For example, when abit votes on a post that has no votes yet (but has passed the 30 minute reverse auction period), he gets a 1.50 out of the six bucks his vote is worth, regardless of what else happens later. If more people vote for it, hell get more, but he can't get less. And even if he comes on to a post that already has a significant number of upvoters, just the weight he adds means that its probably rare for him to not get a significant piece of the pie for just voting.

In a way, what he proposes would make it a similar situation for anyone.

Now if you can predict the whales, then you could make money. The problem is that if youre predicting a whale vote from authors or topics the whale has already voted for, there are already bots doing that. and theyre taking most of the curation rewards (and giving them back to the author in the reverse auction)

Maybe I'm missing something but doesn't this mean that anyone, whale or not, can start upvoting random posts in order to just get the curation rewards?

As for people that will keep downvoting "overvalued" posts, I'm not so sure about that, I have a very specific "group of people" in my mind right now and I don't think that their agenda is for the good of steem.

Yes they can get the rewards, unless the posts they voted got downvoted by others.

I still believe we have more good people/stake than bad ones, so we can overcome that.

I still believe we have more good people/stake than bad ones

I fully agree with that one right now, but I'm not sure what will happen when we will start to attract the majority of "facebook users". I fear there will be a "free money" mentality and it will be in the shoulders of the few to correct the greed of the many.

Rewards are free money, but it is very diffcult to secure a result or predict it. Rewards really amount to the payment for the effort, in a subjective assessment by peers, of the results of the effort. A combination of diligence and luck. It's no less fair or entertaining than a game of Poker really. It even shares some features in common with poker in that the 'opponents' (your competitor curators and creator) decisions are only knowable after the transaction has been made. Predictable votes are easier to front-run.

It's a fair concern, but IMHO it's over-concerned right now.

This is a very good point, the curve-scaling of the votes the way it is now that alters the payout time allows the big votes that come in to progressively extend the payout while other big votes (or downvotes) could still come. The linear distribution does mean that you can gain more on a big one than a little one so there is good reason for the time scaling.

Having said that, with the proposed shift to 7 day payout cycles you don't have this issue, and the votes that go to other than the ones already with big rewards slated are slowly diminished if other posts rise up past it, which counters the avalanche tendency.

But like someone above said, it would be really useful to take historical data and model the distribution of a different algorithm to actually see how it would have affected the payouts already past. Hopefully someone will build that soon. It would also be helpful for the idea that I am promoting, that of witnesses being able to set charges instead of dividends on SBD holders.

Has anyone considered x1/2 yet?

Forgot to mention one thing: the SP delegation feature which will be introduced in 0.17 will fit your needs better.

Steemit Inc., the company, and some whales, will delegate their SP to "verified" good voters, so they'll have more influence and earn more curation rewards.

That's nice, especially if the group of "verified good voters" extends beyond the usual suspects, preventing the "same guild, but now obfuscated"-criticisms, but that's a different thread.

Yes it's considered. But it's weak against Sybil attacks. Bad actors can distribute stakes to many smaller accounts and gain more influence and earn more financial returns.

me and my 8 thousand little sock puppet accounts fully support sublinear vote strength.

lol

Thank you for coming forward, saves us some detective work 8-).

Thousands of minions and dolphins would also fully support sublinear vote strength, btw.

Thousands of minions and dolphins would also fully support sublinear vote strength, btw.

IMHO they'll be disappointed for sure. Although at this moment they have advantages, it's wrong if they think they'll have advantages forever. At last bots running by whales will win.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

True, but (paraphrasing you) "smaller accounts gain more influence and earn more financial returns", and there will always be abuse anyway; possible abuse maybe should be fought in other ways when it keeps you from selecting the best solution. But never mind, I get your point.

I do wonder why this has been presented in previous discussions as a choice between given mathematical functions. Why not draw the curve by hand that does what you want it to do, then find the best fitting function? Not all that important either, I just sometimes wonder about such things.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

The conclusion of previous discussions, as proposed in 0.17, was to give smaller accounts more influence than they have now, but still smaller than big accounts. What I proposed now, is to give same stake the same influence.

By the way I'm not good at drawing curves, but my proposal is a simple straight line.

Pff. That's just because you are no good at drawing curves 8-).

I like your proposal, btw, I also think linear is a good way to go.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

It would be interesting to try to calculate what would be the reward for todays trending posts if calculated with linear distribution.
I guess top-1 post having 130$ now would get just 30$ .

I vote as soon as I read a post doesn't matter to me when it's been posted.

So IMHO you're neutral right now.

Whatever that means lol

At least you didn't say "linear is bad". :)
Thanks for joining the discussion.

Your welcome :)

Here's a suggestion:
Part A: The weight of one's votes to be an algorithm linked to: 1) steem power held, 2) reputation score, 3) number of followers, 4) number of votes cast in the past 30 days - up to (4030) 1200 votes; and in the past 7 days - up to (407) 280 votes, 5) number of articles posted in the past 30 days - up to (430) 120 articles, and in the past 7 days - up to( 47) 28 articles, 6) number (not value) of votes received for articles posted in the past 30 days 7) number of articles re-steemed in the past 30 days, 8) number of articles promoted in the past 30 days - that kind of thing. This way, voting power is based more upon recent participation - the more one participates and receives votes, the more their vote weighs. This would encourage activity, and it matters not what anyone else does. To a point, whales and anyone simply buying a lot of steem power must consistently remain active to have a heavily weighted vote.
Part B - Voting: Adjust the code so that the vote button is not active until the article is opened. This should encourage organic voting.
Part C - Payout:

  1. earlier voters of an article receive a more than others, much like the current curve, but the curve to be closer to linear than it is now.
  2. Use an algorithm which would randomly select the "sweet spot" for the voting on each article. The "sweet spot" could be anywhere from 1 minute to the entire 6-day, 23-hour, 59-minute time frame (or cut it off at 6 days) . In this way no one can set a bot to steal payouts at the exact 30-minute time slot.

I also like the idea of trying such suggestions in a simulation. I have no programming knowledge, so I'm unable to help in that fashion.

Thanks for the opportunity to voice my opinion. I love Steemit!

Steem On!!!

Thanks for expressing your opinions.
I haven't read it thoroughly, but the first feeling is that you provided only factors but no formula, with so many factors it's complicated and hard to balance among each factor, among those factors, some can be gamed easily, some are hard to add into calculation.
Looking forward to more discussions though.

I don't have a formula. The suggestion was for discussion; and if it is found to be feasible, then perhaps an adequate and fair formula can be found through discussion. I would have no idea where to start to develop a formula for this. Many others would be more suitable for that task than I.
I simply believe the weight of a vote should not only be attained by long past participation, but for recent and continual participation.
This way, a whale cannot simply sit idle and draw large curation rewards with only a bot. I'm not implying any do, but this should help eliminate the possibility of it. This should also give higher rewards to those actively involved in Steemit who 1) continue with higher-quality posts (those with more votes), 2) maintain a higher following (generally through higher-quality posts), and 3) actually open and (hopefully) read an article

This should also give higher rewards to those actively involved in Steemit who 1) continue with higher-quality posts (those with more votes), 2) maintain a higher following (generally through higher-quality posts), and 3) actually open and (hopefully) read an article

Posting and curation are the two sides of the game. Authors earn author rewards by contributing contents, curators earn curation rewards by contributing money and time/efforts. IMHO it's no need to bias too much to authors, for example to give authors extra curation rewards. If people value their work, people will vote more on their contents so they can earn more author rewards, or delegate more SP to them so they can earn more curation rewards. Then they'll have more stake, so can earn more curation rewards.

I believe the author should be rewarded much more than someone who reads the content and votes upon it. The author may have spent hours or days composing the piece, weeks or months living through it, and years with the memory.
At most, the curator spends 15 minutes to half an hour reading or watching a video. Worse, *the curator may not even have seen the piece *- especially if a bot does the voting!
I'm not saying curators have no value. I'm saying too many people are putting too much value on bots voting for unseen content, when to vote and whether or not a whale will vote after him or her. I'm saying too much ado is made over the payout for the curators and the voters, and not enough support is for the author and the content. If it weren't for the author's content, nothing would be available on which to vote.

No, I don't have an algorithm for supporting the voting suggestion in my earlier post, but I believe my suggestion supports organic growth and use - upon what seems the Steemit founders, @ned and @dantheman, originally envisioned. Does anyone think the founders designed Steemit with sybill attacks and bots in mind as the top earners? I don't. I believe that why Steemit has had to change the algorithm (at least once) - to protect against them - and to protect the author!

I am FOR the author. I am FOR organic curation. I am FOR the way Steemit was originally designed.

I am NOT against bots. I AM against bots consistently taking the top curation payout over organic curators. I AM against organic curators casting a vote on a post simply because it is at the "sweet spot" for voting. Perhaps a randomized "sweet spot" will give bots and organic voters even footing on this issue.

As far as people simply "delegating" more SP" to the author: Earning Steem and SP is difficult enough, especially for minnows. Many are attempting to claw out a few here and there; therefore, giving it away can be arduous.

Please understand, I'm not trying to pick a fight with you, or anyone. Please don't take what I say personally. I'm just beginning to believe many are voting not on good content, but what can be gleaned from the reward pool.

I believe if your following statement were true:

If people value their work, people will vote more on their contents so they can earn more author rewards, or delegate more SP to them...
then bots would not be vying for the "sweet spot" of curation rewards, and the bot-less would not be upvoting articles on the Trending page (without reading them) simply in hopes of gaining more reward. (I have seen - in comments mostly - that people do this in order to gain a little more Steem and SP; and, if I remember correctly, someone suggested this practice to a newbie!)

I believe a lot of good content is shoved aside in search of payout *< not saying all content with high payout is crap> *, and my suggestion may be one of hundreds which may conglomerate to bring Steemit to a *sweet spot * between people, bots, and greed *< for we are all greedy by nature > *.

Upvoted for the thoughtful reply. Although I don't agree with some of them. I'm not fighting with you as well :)
Quantity of pure readers is more than voters, which is more than people who comment, which is more than bloggers.
Generally, I think well-designed incentive mechanisms are better than no incentive at all, which is better than bad-designed incentive mechanisms. That said, incentives should be aligned. Rewarding little to curators means no incentive, which encourages doing nothing, or worse, vote buying, although vote buying is not always a bad thing. Over-rewarding is usually counter productive as well. Anyway, capital will find its way out.

A way around bot farming would be to have a greater % of curation rewards going to people who actually vote after opening the blog.

From my knowledge/experience, that's impossible on current blockchain based system.

But Google somehow finds bot- clickers in AdWords system and deletes their payout. I don't see difference between AdWords bot clickers and steemit legions of bots

Steem(it) is not against bots and in fact there's no difference if a vote or comment or whatever was made by a bot as far as the blockchain is concerned.

It would certainly be possible to make a good guess to see if some behaviour was likely to be a bot (I proposed just such a web app idea here called Bot or Not? 😄) but it completely allowed. So to be clear, Google Adwords have a policy against non-human visitors (bots), steem does not.

Good idea for the first step.

If you support the idea please let a comment! 😊

I can just say it's different.
Google has final say about their product and data, it's centralized. The rules can be changed very quickly as they see fit.
Steem is not. Rules in Steem are pre-defined consensus and not easy to change. It's extremely hard if not impossible to clearly define such "delete payout after found guilty" rules and implement them. Bots are simply smarter than human when acting by existed rules. Also "guilty" is often subjective, so can be abused as well.

I mean that human content evaluation (POW analog ) is more effective than bot's, so if there's a way to separate them it may be useful. But if you say that there is no such "Maxwell Daemon" than OK, let's live with them..

I think so too. Views are stemit.com level only

I don't agree that Steem voting rewards should be linear. All upvotes on other accounts' posts would come at the theoretical cost of not upvoting your own comments. Effectively it would turn it into a convoluted tipping game. The other similar blockchain social projects are essentially tipping platforms and I think Steem holds an advantage over them because the rewards are superlinear thus encouraging more natural voting.

That said, I'm in favor of the curve being flattened, but not made completely so.

It's still different.
In a pure tipping system you can opt out by not tipping at all, so it naturally encourages type II misbehavior: false negative.
In Steem you're forced to tip, so you'll make judgement on targets, although perhaps it's random targeted, it's more natural.

Well I did say it was convoluted :D

Another difference is downvoting, which is a pure tipping system won't have.

And in a pure tipping system, IMHO it's easier to manipulate the trending page by tipping to yourself or sock puppets, perhaps it can be limited by a fee bounded or other limitation, but it's still weaker than stake weighted voting. Just my own opinion though, I could be wrong.

I tend to agree it would be best flattened but not completely so. I also have no idea how correct this assertion is.

I read almost all comments on this post and all in all it was a really interesting read.

but then this becomes tiping, which doesn't work. I'm afraid that people would vote mostly for own comments/posts.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

People using their own stake/votes/influence on their own contents is FAIR. They'll get less downvotes as long as the contents aren't overvalued. It's my opinion on "dust mining" issue, mentioned in the post.

I still believe we have more good people/stake than bad ones, so we can overcome that.

Also, "tipping doesn't work" is unproven. At least DODG is still alive and has its place to play.

People using their own stake/votes/influence on their own contents is FAIR.

no one force anyone to join steem, so if someone accept the rules of the network, then according to this person this is fair. Actually... changing rules of the network can be unfair.

Also, "tipping doesn't work" is unproven.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it is also unproven, that it works - no major social media player figure out how to introduce tipping successfully.

We have more and more discussions about economy of whole Steem - what is good, the problem is that right now we do not have to many possibilities to test particular assumptions.

We need not only substeems, but also substeems which would be able to modify some rules for particular substeem.

Actually... changing rules of the network can be unfair.

It's why we're discussing but not just code it.

no one force anyone to join steem, so if someone accept the rules of the network, then according to this person this is fair.

Correct. Different rules attract different players. The platform as a whole should attract and keep the most valuable players. IMHO the highest priority is mass adoption, so a simpler rule will help more.

Also, "tipping doesn't work" is unproven.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it is also unproven, that it works - no major social media player figure out how to introduce tipping successfully.

Yes you're correct. I believe that pure tipping won't work as well. As I explained above (replied to pfunk), with a linear distribution mechanism, Steem still have its advantages than pure tipping.

We need not only substeems, but also substeems which would be able to modify some rules for particular substeem.

This is a good idea, although it would need much efforts to be done. Smart contracts would be an option. I guess we'll finally have them if the platform can survive.

Tipping is working when it's appropriately combined with influence. E.g. Superchat of Youtube

Let's see how it goes. I think should be better for most people.

This is one of the best ideas I heard since a long time! This will be great for everyone and people will upvote with pleasure even after 10-20 hours. I use to do this a lot of times only because I like it and I don't care about curation rewards. I never did because I don't earn so much and at least that is what I can't do for a good and informative post.
This is really a good idea and I hope that Steemit will adopt it! Great work and glad that steemit has such great witnesses!

KISS. YES.

Do you think "Pure Linear Distribution" can be implemented or will the whale's greed destroy Steemit.
001.gif

So we're now discussing. If good things can't be implemented due to whales' greed, people will leave. Whales have more to lose if Steem is destroyed.

I don't think greed is a bad (or an avoidable) thing. If you design a system where you say to people "vote like this and you will earn one dollar, but vote like that and you will earn two dollars" them voting the second way isn't surprising, and should not be judged negatively.

A system that requires, in order to function properly, participants to ignore their own immediate financial best interests is not a viable system.

A system that can be ruined by greed never had a chance in the first place.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

True. But this argument doesn't prove linear is bad, nor prove it's good.
IMHO, a little greed is good, but too greed is not good, so it's good to give some financial incentives but not too many. Over-rewarding is often counter-productive.

The majority of people who learn they can make money blogging will leave when they find only a few people are getting the money. Broken promises and lies are a BIG turnoff. I don't think the majority of whales who are sucking the pool dry give a flying dutchman. Human nature.
greed-says-there-is-never-enough-abundance-says-there-is-more-than-enough-greed-closes-the-door-quote-1.jpg

Can you explain why you think whales are sucking the reward pool dry?

I am new, so, I admit that I have less of a bird's eye view than most whales and dolphins, yet, after putting out posts that were probably worthy of getting more attention than a few cents or dollars and seeing Poor Quality content featured over HQ posts I considered a closer look and an open mind would behoove my pollyanna outlook. Don't get me wrong I love Steemit and the community but something is happening at Steemit. I was fortunate to experience what happens when a whale (Ned) takes an interest in a post. That event inspired me to put out HQ posts. I learned by getting involved reading many informative posts and their comments. I learned what Steemit looks to support steemians to be featured. It made sense, so, I became pickier with my upvotes but always giving out HQ supportive comments to inspire others. I'm slowly realizing something BIGGER is going on that one minnow like me is not going to change and it'll get easier to see as the pool gets smaller and the heavy weights throw themselves around a shallower pool. I'm still open to different vantage points if you have one.
whale fail.gif

I agree...Greed is not rational, never will be... screw Ayn Rand.

Thank you @abit - I see you have an eye on the future of steemit and the importance of being able to explain a concept on one side of A4! There still needs to be an ability for someone to work out the value of their vote (nominally) through the two metrics available SP and Rep.,given a nominal day.
Linear rewards should also allow for account consolidation (1) - all bot accounts should be declared as such. This is Social Media and there are people at the heart of the future.

Thanks for posting this. I will try to spread it around:)

https://twitter.com/Soul_Eater_43/status/837631842635378689

Soul_Eater_43 The Cryptofiend tweeted @ 03 Mar 2017 - 11:52 UTC

Benefits of Pure Linear #Rewards Distribution — @Steemit

steemit.com/curation/@abit… / https://t.co/F9CNUejpiy

#blockchain #distribution https://t.co/FEi6JMoZfe

Disclaimer: I am just a bot trying to be helpful.

  ·  8 years ago (edited)

I hope everyone thoroughly reads the article and the comments. I understood everything but the math dealing with curves. Thank you all for working so hard and being so open with your ideas and opinions. I am really enjoying being here during Steemits beta phase.