War in Israel against Hamas

The Israeli Air Force continues to launch airstrikes on the Gaza Strip since the "Black Saturday" attack on October 7th - command centers, positions, and terror infrastructure, militants and their supporters - all rising to the skies in a cloud of fire and smoke. This bombing campaign is undoubtedly the largest seen in the Middle East since the Gulf Wars, and it is growing stronger day by day.
Yet, every day and every night since the sirens wailed, people in Israel rush to seek shelter in protected spaces. Many continuously ask: If Israel’s IDF pounds them so relentlessly, how is it that Hamas militants still manage to fire rockets into Israel’s territories?
On the surface, this is a very reasonable question; when an enemy is under heavy fire, it's natural to assume that it would be difficult for them to conduct military operations, especially daily rocket attacks.
Of course, the IDF is aiming to strike the enemy's arsenal with force - the idea is to restore calm to Israeli communities and weaken Hamas's military power.
But Hamas is not a regular army, and the Israeli Air Force is dealing with this challenge differently than one might think - and for good reasons. To understand how Hamas militants continue to launch rockets into Israel, we need to take a closer look at the organization's rocket system and how it operates.
Rocket fire from Gaza began in April 2001 and was initially based on Qassam rockets - homemade rockets with engines made from readily available chemicals like fertilizers and sugar.
Initially, Qassam rocket launches were considered a high-quality and unique operation that required a high level of skill. The dangerous manufacturing process led to numerous workplace accidents, and getting to the appropriate launch point was a risk in itself. Not everyone could set up the rocket in the launch tube and aim it accurately towards Israeli settlements.
The IDF responded to this threat by deploying surveillance aircraft, quickly learning to identify behaviors and indications of rocket attacks. Many Hamas militants lost their lives as a result, thanks to the IDF's Apache helicopter teams and other assets.
The militants observed, learned, and adapted. Over time, the rockets improved, and their operation became simpler. Links to Iran and other countries made it easier to obtain standardized rockets, more reliable than those produced in Gaza's workshops. Hamas began to expand its rocket system in a way that bypassed the technological advantages of the IDF. Today, there are five reasons why the terrorist organization can continue to fire rockets even though Israel does not stop its operations.
The first reason is the layout. Hamas's rocket system is dispersed over a vast area and is built in a way that makes it impossible to pinpoint the location of each launcher. They use rocket launch pits: they dig tunnels and place rails inside, with each pit containing a rocket. The rockets are pre-aimed at specific Israeli areas. Short-range rockets are aimed at Gaza's vicinity and Ashkelon, and medium-range rockets target the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Launching is done remotely or on a timer, and the militants can initiate the launch from a nearby bunker without exposing themselves. Each pit is one-time-use; the launch burns the rail and often destroys the guidance system of the rocket, making it challenging for Hamas to reestablish its operation during wartime.
Long-range rockets, intended to reach Haifa, for example, are launched from multi-use underground facilities. The launcher is part of their tunnel system and sits on tracks that allow them to aim as needed. However, most of their launch infrastructure is above ground, and they fire only once.
When the militants dig these pits, they cover the area with camouflage nets or structures, doing this continuously for many years. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where Israel does not know the exact locations of the launch pits. The IDF found a smart solution to this problem: Iron Dome intercepts the rockets in the air - those that pose an actual threat - eliminating the need to scour Gaza until finding the launcher.
But the sheer number of launch pits still allows Hamas to continue firing even when under fire from all directions. I can't estimate how many launch pits there are in Gaza, but it wouldn't surprise me if, in ten years, children playing outside their homes would accidentally uncover a stash of Grad rockets.
The second reason for continued rocket fire is the structure of Hamas's rocket system. It was designed to operate independently of command structures and control systems. To launch a volley of rockets towards Israel, all the militants need is the order to go, and access to the launcher, making it easy to fire without a precise command chain.
Even precise aiming is unnecessary; everything is pre-aimed and pre-calibrated (allowing the militants to fire without complicating things with guidance systems or revealing themselves, or high level of skill by the launching terrorist). Thus, even if we eliminate high-ranking commanders and officers, the remaining personnel in the field can still launch rockets when ordered. Without commanders, it will be more challenging to coordinate complex attacks, defensive moves, ambushes, and the like - but firing Grad rockets is a simple task for Hamas.
The third reason is the policy of managing firepower. Hamas embarked on its murderous attack on "Black Saturday" with the understanding that it would lead to a full-scale war with the IDF. They would have no reinforcement, no resupply of ammunition, and they had to use what they had wisely until the end of the conflict.
This is one of the reasons why the organization dug deep and long tunnels, built bunkers under hospitals, and fortified infrastructure to survive prolonged fighting. Their rocket policy was also designed to be cost-effective - at this stage, Hamas's idea is not to inflict maximum damage on Israel or the IDF, but to preserve its rocket arsenal as long as possible. Attrition is a valid tactic in this case, slow as it may be.
So, the militants fire relatively few rockets in each volley, choosing when to concentrate efforts and shoot more. They know, for example, that in Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Sderot, there are multiple warning areas, and launching one launch pit will trigger warning sirens in those areas. The policy is frugal, and Hamas achieves its goals by firing fewer rockets than it has in its arsenal since the beginning of the conflict. The chaos and fear-mongering is part of the goal, regardless of a successful hit and casualties.
The fourth reason is public relations. Rocket fire serves an important purpose for Hamas - it attempts to show the Arab world that it stands strong against the IDF and, in doing so, maintains the idea of Sunni resistance. Hamas is struggling with deteriorating circumstances; its assets and capabilities are being eroded, and it's gradually being pushed towards the wall.
Yes, it has underground assets that pose a challenge, but they can be reached. What's left for Hamas to do to prove it's still alive and kicking? Keep firing rockets. As long as rockets are launched toward Israel, the Arab world may believe that Hamas is putting up a fight and influencing Israel.
On the one hand, rocket fire is intimidating, and civilians have to enter protected spaces when necessary, which disrupts routine life. But on the other hand, it does not significantly affect the pace and structure of the fighting - and the IDF continues to advance and weaken Hamas.
The fifth reason is IDF's own priorities. Every war is a game of resources: there are limited reserves of fuel and ammunition, a finite number of combat-ready soldiers, and support and legitimacy can change - both domestically and internationally. Therefore, the IDF focuses on what will expedite victory the most, while allocating fewer resources elsewhere.
It's not as if there's a Death Star that, with one precise hit, will annihilate Hamas completely, and the enemy will surrender. But there are certainly focal points where concentrating efforts is worthwhile. For example, neutralizing Hamas's command and control systems would disrupt its organized operations and expedite its loss. That's what the IDF did in Operation Protective Edge in 2014 and continues to do today.
At the same time, IDF soldiers are carrying out pinpoint strikes on Hamas militants who are not on the list of high-priority targets but are still relevant to the organization's capabilities.
In conclusion, Hamas's rocket system is designed to withstand airstrikes and allow the organization to continue launching rockets even during a full-scale conflict. The IDF's strategy is focused on key objectives, and while rocket fire is disruptive and concerning for Israeli civilians, it does not significantly impede the overall progress of the military operation against Hamas.