官僚主义的弊端：从经济学角度解析（二）

接着昨天的话题，所以说昨天指出，昨天聊阅读米塞斯的官僚主义。这本书介绍其中的观点指出，私营企业与关鸟机构在效率上的巨大差异的根本原因是因为新企业具有效率核算的机制啊，官疗器也没啊，官疗机构没有为什么效益核算会带来这么大的？那么效率核算又是如何影响企业的？而且如今一些利润核算机制是如何影响企业的架构的。而且如今一些私营企业的规模也是相当庞大，有的甚至是跨国公司可以以这些大型企业的组织架构看上去和官僚机构十分类似，那是否意味着私营企业也会遭遇官僚企业，官僚机构同样的问题呢？米赛斯的答案有点出乎我的意料。他的认为是只要是有利润核算机制存在嗯适应企业的规模，并不会导致官僚制度的各种问题。原因是利润核算为企业的高层主管提供了一个非常简便的管理工具。一个公司的总经理并不需要事无巨细的对show手下的部门经理进行指导和管理，他完全可以放手，让这些部门经理按照自己的意愿和方式管理自己的部门。他只要抓住一条，就是这个部门投入的纸巾，有没有创造出更多的利润。而下面的这些部门经理也会尽量把事情做好。对他们来说，事情做好很简单，也就是产生更多的利润。你不用担心他们会消极怠工躺平。因为这样做就是在和自己的工资和饭碗，过不去出于个人的利益，他们也会努力实现利润目标。即便有些部门并不生产最终产品，比如有的部门只生产零件，而由其他部门组装成最终产品出售。因为存在着外部市场企业的高层管理，也可以通过和市场上相同质量的零部件价格比较来判断由自己的部门生产。这些零部件是否核算，可以看出，只要抓住利润核算机制，再大的企业都可以实行分权化的管理，类似古代的那种分封制，而官僚制起源于国家帝国的形成是同步的。比如其实这一点，从比赛斯的这些比赛斯的观点，从中国结合中国的历史似乎更容易理解。比如武王伐纣之周灭商之后，周天子实行的也是类似公司制。这样的开分公司的形式，将宗室和功臣分封到全国各地。各自管理一块封地，周天子对诸侯也不多加干涉诸侯，拥有相当大的自主权，只是仅仅是富有在周王室受到威胁时出兵保护的义务。但是政权和公司不同的是，就是缺少利润核算的机制。诸侯权力很大啊，周天子却没有一个简单有效的方法考核。他的工作是否称职，无法影响诸侯的费立和继承。久而久之，到了东周十七也就成了孔子所说的礼崩乐坏。周王是的，影响力越来越小，诸侯之间强大的诸侯之间也彼此不服，互相争发。对最近年的改革出现在秦国的商鞅变法是第七第春秋战国时期中的法家应该说是中国官僚制度的创始者了。他所他们所提出的方案就是取消周朝那种开分公司式的分封制啊，以郡县制代替。但是，改革郡建制用官吏取代诸侯，对全国进行管理，同样面临着考核核算机制的问题，不是不是首先，政权统治者，比如秦始皇，他不是像一个企业家一样来提供社会所需要的产品和服务。当然你也可以说，他提供的服务是一个稳定的社会稳定，没有战争的社会环境。但是这种服务无法通过市场，通过消费者的自愿购买来进行定价，所以也是无法进行经济，也是无法进行利润核算的。啊，如果没有好的考核机制，用官吏取代诸侯，不过是名称的变化而已，就成了换汤不换药。而法家的解决方案就是设立名目繁多、事无巨细的法规与条纹约束官吏考核官吏这样官僚机构所追求的，也有了自己所追求的目标。不过他不是一般企业所追求的利润啊，是对规则的遵守。

Following yesterday's topic, so say yesterday pointed out, yesterday chatted about reading Mises's bureaucracy. This book introduces the point of view which points out that the fundamental reason for the huge difference in efficiency between private enterprises and bird organizations is that new enterprises have the mechanism of efficiency accounting, ah, and official medical institutions do not have ah, why does the benefit accounting of official medical institutions bring such a big difference? So how does efficiency accounting affect the enterprise? And how some of today's profit accounting mechanisms affect the structure of the business. And now some of the private enterprises are quite large, and some even multinational corporations can look very similar to bureaucracies with the organizational structure of these large enterprises, does that mean that private enterprises will suffer from the same problems as bureaucracies? Mises's answer was a bit of a surprise. His argument is that as long as there are profit accounting mechanisms in place that are well adapted to the size of the firm, it doesn't lead to all kinds of bureaucratic problems. The reason is that profit accounting provides a very simple management tool for the top executives of the company. The general manager of a company does not need to micromanage and guide the department managers under show, he can completely let go and let these department managers manage their own departments according to their own wishes and ways. He just grabbed one, that is, the paper towel invested in this department, whether it has created more profits. And these department managers will try to get things done. For them, getting things done is as simple as generating more profits. You don't have to worry about them slacking off. Because in doing so, they are jeopardizing their own wages and rice bowls, and out of personal interest, they will also strive to achieve profit goals. Even if some departments do not produce final products, for example, some departments only produce parts that are assembled by other departments into final products for sale. Because of the presence of the top management of an external market company, it is also possible to judge the production of its own department by comparing the price of parts with that of the same quality in the market. Whether these parts are accounted for, it can be seen that as long as the profit accounting mechanism is grasped, no matter how large the enterprise can implement decentralized management, similar to the ancient partition system, and the bureaucracy originated from the formation of the state empire is synchronous. For example, in fact this point, from the point of view of these matches, from China combined with Chinese history seems easier to understand. For example, after King Wu attacked Zhou Zhou and destroyed the Shang Dynasty, the son of Zhou Tianzi also implemented a similar corporate system. In the form of such branch offices, the patriarchs and meritorious officials were assigned to all parts of the country. Each administered a fiefdom, and the sons of the Zhou did not interfere much with the princes, who had considerable autonomy, but only had the obligation to send troops to protect the Zhou royal family when it was threatened. But governments, unlike corporations, lack a mechanism for accounting for profits. Vassals have a lot of power, but Zhou Tianzi does not have a simple and effective way to evaluate. Whether or not he was competent in his work could not affect the feili and succession of the princes. Over time, to the Eastern Zhou 17th also became what Confucius said Li collapse music bad. The influence of the Zhou king was getting smaller and smaller, and the powerful princes were disobeying each other and fighting with each other. The most recent reform of the Shang Yang Reform in the State of Qin was the legalists of the seventh Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States period who were the founders of the Chinese bureaucracy. The plan they put forward was to abolish the Zhou Dynasty's branch office system and replace it with a county system. However, the reform of the county system, replacing the vassals with officials, and managing the whole country also faced the problem of assessment and accounting mechanism. First of all, the political rulers, such as the First Emperor of Qin, did not provide the products and services needed by the society like an entrepreneur. Of course you can also say that the service he provides is a stable social stable, no war social environment. However, this kind of service cannot be priced through the market and the voluntary purchase of consumers, so it is also impossible to carry out economic and profit accounting. Ah, if there is no good evaluation mechanism, replacing vassals with officials will only be a change of name, and it will become a change of soup without a change of medicine. The legalist solution was to set up numerous and detailed regulations and stripes to restrain officials and evaluate officials, and the bureaucracy pursued its own goals. But it is not the profit pursued by ordinary enterprises, it is the compliance with the rules.