There are similar ideas in Quine and Wittgenstein (or late Wittgenstein at least). Krikpe extended on Wittgenstein with the idea that all there is to our use of words is what we can assert about the correct way to use them - and that this means that there are no 'real' meanings (just acceptable moves in different language games).
RE: A Linguistic Case for Nihilism
You are viewing a single comment's thread from:
A Linguistic Case for Nihilism
I'm not familiar with Quine. Do you mean old Thomas?
Either way, I completely agree that Wittgenstein, particularly when he discusses the idea of "game," is an intellectual precursor to prototype theory. If there are no 'real' meanings, do you think that leads necessarily to nihilism? Thanks!
Downvoting a post can decrease pending rewards and make it less visible. Common reasons:
Submit