Tactical Theory: Resurrecting Football's 2
If you have read Jonathan Wilson’s extraordinary book, “Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Soccer Tactics”, you are well aware of football’s historic march from attack centred formations and subsequent footnotes. As the book portrays, football tactics started with attack-minded systems, then became more defensive in the pursuit of results.
Like today’s game, tactical trends and formations followed a problem/solution progression. Though the discovery and implementation of new tactics and philosophies emerged at a far slower rate than the modern game, no doubt due to professionalising the sport and use of technology.
Formations like England’s and Scotland’s in the first international match certainly strike the modern fan, coach and analyst as novelties of football history and, to an extent, they are. The pyramid formation will strike a similar tone. You might ask how teams defended with just two defenders.
With football returning to more attacking philosophies, there are many historic influences, but none greater than the legendary Johan Cruyff. His time at Ajax and Barcelona shaped the modern game, developing his philosophy and winning over disciples who have carried on his legacy.
In this tactical analysis, “Inverting the Pyramid” will serve as our guide to football’s earliest developments, then I will give an account of my research in the usage of outside-backs, a key cog in this project. In the end, this article will show how modern tacticians have resurrected and implemented the pyramid formation. Examples of usage and tactical responsibilities will show how this is no longer a novel concept of a previous age, but an attacking system favoured by many of Europe’s elite.
Historic use of the outside-backs
The first 90 years of tactics followed a common tactical structure: high targets across the forward line and the remaining players taking away the middle. As Wilson notes, football was highly individualized in the early days. Dribbling ability was the mark of a great player and a physical approach was equated with toughness. Early losses to the English led Scotland to develop the passing side of the game, but both approaches fit within the pyramid formation.
As you can see in the image below, the basic structure of the pyramid allowed for greater width in attack while protecting against central counterattacks. The skilful forwards were covered by midfielders or centre-halves. As possession was lost and teams moved into their defensive third, the centre-halves joined the full-backs to numerically account for the opposition’s forwards.
In the 1920s, legendary coach Herbert Chapman introduced the W-M formation. A variation of the 2-3-5, the W-M layered the forward line, adding an element of central dominance and triangulation. This ensured losses of possession resulted in the opposition needing to clear another line of defence. Chapman is known for placing results above style, so, while this evolution of tactics was more pragmatic and defensively sound, it does initiate a more defensive, pragmatic, results-based approach to the sport, a trend that would continue for several more decades as one. Progressions included one, then a second, centre-half dropping in between the full-backs for further defensive solidity.
In fact, after the M-M, many teams moved towards a 4-2-4. Historically, this was the next major evolution of tactics. The centre-half now took on the roles previously assigned to the full-backs, making the centre-halves fully back. Regardless of whether the centre-backs were flat or in a sweeper/stopper alignment, the full-backs of the past were seen more as defensive cover.
In my search for the modern outside-back, I analysed a number of historic matches. Researching outside-backs who made all-time best lists led me to the following games.
- Inter Milan vs Celtic (25 May 1967)
- Brazil vs Italy (21 June 1970)
- Ajax vs Juventus (30 May 1973)
- Italy vs Brazil (5 July 1982)
- AC Milan vs Real Madrid (19 April 1989)
- AC Milan vs Barcelona (18 May 1994)
With the exception of Cruyff’s Ajax, those first three matches featured few rotations, opting for a more tactically rigid approach. While the Brazil and Ajax teams of the 1970s were well ahead of their time, it was clear that these were the early days of a revolution. Line breaking passes, positional triangulation and intense pressing were foundational to their approach. Additionally, Brazil’s use of Carlos Alberto and Everaldo saw the outside-backs take on attacking responsibilities high up the pitch.
The success of attacking outside-backs produced a paradigm shift. Rather than forcing the creatives into congested midfields, teams used the outside-backs almost as an additional midfielder. As the game evolved, outside-backs became more involved in the attack, giving us players like Roberto Carlos, Javier Zanetti, Philipp Lahm, Dani Alves and Marcelo. Now, we are witnessing another progression, which is really a return to our footballing roots.
Inspired by the totaalvoetbal of Michels and Cruyff, Barcelona’s Juego de Posición and the renewal of Ajax point to an evolutionary advancement in attacking football. Following Cruyff’s petri dishes, Ajax and Barcelona, we’re seeing his students and their direct rivals adapt the fundamental tactical principles of the pyramid to the modern game. With a basic understanding of the pyramid’s history and development of modern outside-backs, it’s time to look closely at the manifestations and variations of the in play today. Rather than giving an overview of each team, we’ll investigate the tactical theory driving this new application of the pyramid, showcasing some of the leading teams in the world and noting some of the tactical nuances that distinguish the clubs.
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Three forwards occupy the centre
Last summer, the transfer of Antoine Griezmann from Atlético Madrid to Barcelona led many, myself included, to ask how the Catalans would deploy three centre-forwards in the starting lineup. Despite some inconsistencies in attack and issues beating the low block, Barcelona average a staggering 2.25 goals per match, conceding an average of 1.03.
Though the side is not nearly on par with the Golden Generation, which was developed by Cruyff and coached by Pep Guardiola, the attacking mentality of Barcelona is ever-present. With the side commonly featuring three centre-forwards, the basic idea is to occupy the middle of the pitch and provide width through the outside-backs. The reasoning behind this tactical motive is that teams are already dropping off into deep blocks. Whether or not Barcelona, or any of these other pyramid teams, dedicates players to Zones 14 and 17, the opposition will. Without players sitting in those zones, it’s extremely difficult to connect crosses, engage in combination play or run in behind the lines.
As Barcelona enter their attacking half of the pitch, the centre-forwards tend to occupy the central channel. The one exception, of course, is Messi, who drops into a more standard creative midfield role. One variation we see with Barcelona is that, rather than positioning Messi in that highest line, allowing opponents to largely negate his influence, Barcelona use players like Arturo Vidal and Ivan Rakitić to switch positions with the Argentine. As you see in the image below, by situating the three centre-forwards so closely to each other, the defence becomes horizontally compact, freeing the wings and half-spaces for the outside-backs.