Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

General Marshall

In the last post, we saw that as the US solidified its containment policy in the spring of 1947, it was at the same time continuing the postwar demobilization of its armed forces. The latter policy pushed Washington to end the occupation of Korea, while the former policy demanded that it do so without allowing the Soviet Union to expand its area of control into the southern half of Korea. As the US prepared to discuss the issue at the Council of Foreign Ministers in April, it had no confidence that it would be able to cooperate with the Soviet Union to create a provisional government in Korea. It is surprising, therefore, that the two powers agreed to resume meetings of the Joint Commission when they discussed Korea at the Moscow conference.

Secretary of State Marshall raised the issue in a letter sent to Foreign Minister Molotov at the beginning of the conference. He began, quite correctly, by charging that the Soviet Union was responsible for preventing the economic unification of Korea. He then noted that the American commander had requested that the Joint Commission resume but the Soviet commander had refused. Marshall also exposed the flimsy pretense the Soviets had used to deadlock the negotiations. He stated that the impasse was caused by the Soviet desire to exclude the majority of Korean leaders from consultation by insisting on a particular definition of the word “democratic.” He recommended that in the interests of Korea’s well-being, the two powers should reconvene the Joint Commission on the basis of respect for freedom of expression.

Marshall strengthened the call for resumption of the Joint Commission by stating that the United States would begin implementing the 1945 Moscow agreement in its own zone. In other words, if the Soviets did not cooperate to create a provisional government in Seoul, the Americans would do so unilaterally. This threat worked. In his reply, Molotov agreed to reconvene the Joint Commission on May 20, though he held to the Soviet line regarding which political parties could be consulted. The Soviet foreign minister insisted that the Joint Commission’s work be done “on a basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea.”

Marshall understood that Molotov would define “exact execution” as requiring the disqualification of all Korean leaders who opposed trusteeship. He therefore reiterated the US position that the Joint Commission should not deny the right of consultation because of views the political parties had previously expressed. However, since he wanted to resume the meetings, Marshall offered a compromise solution. The Joint Commission would consult with all persons who were willing to cooperate with the occupying powers.

Molotov accepted Marshall’s new condition, as long as the two sides excluded any party or group that “fomented or instigated” active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. Marshall then approved Molotov’s terms on May 12, despite advice from State Department Political Officer Langdon that rightist parties in the South would not participate in the Commission if they did not have complete freedom of expression.

We can see, therefore, that when the Soviet and American commands resumed meetings of the Joint Commission in May 1947, they did so without any expectation that the negotiations would succeed in creating a provisional government for Korea. The Soviets were not going to give up the security buffer they had created in the northern half of the peninsula and the Americans were not going to agree to create a communist government in Seoul. The Joint Commission was, in effect, going to be a piece of political theater. But what was the purpose of this performance? Who was the audience?

In the next post, we will look at the discussion of the German question, which was the main agenda item at the April 1947 Council of Foreign Ministers. The heated debate over actions that would lead to the creation of two states in Germany provides clues as to why the Soviets and Americans resumed hopeless meetings of the Joint Commission in Seoul.

[Sources: This post relies on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985)]