To be clear: I think the professor was uncivil to behave as he did even if he believes as he allegedly does (let us assume he does). And I don’t think he should believe as he does. It’s based on an incorrect theology, social analysis, philosophy of gender, sense of social propriety and comportment, and many other things.
But I also take very seriously free speech, and academic freedom. But since this isn’t a matter of scholarship but rather social protocol for addressing a student, I don’t see it as an academic freedom issue.
But I can see how it’s a free speech issue in principle for any school. And the key thing is legally how it’s a free speech issue given that he’s a government employee.
I haven’t read the court decision nor thought this through deeply. My initial impression is that in a private academic institution the free speech issue is trumped the right of the employer — or if you prefer, the academic community — to set norms of comportment. They don’t have to be norms of belief. But I can be told I can’t call students by derogatory epithets nor “buddy boy” nor, well, any reasonable social requirement for how to address people. Teachers are there to make student part of a community of learning so students need to be treated with respect as they see it or else the job can’t get done.
The rub is what to say about the special obligations that come when the institution is a part of the state. This is one of the reasons why even though I’m very much in favor of universal access to affordable education, I’m uncomfortable with it being a function of the government. Public education seems like a good thing. The first amendment also seems like a good thing. And so it looks like we can run into an unintended consequence. It seems to me when the state is essentially acting in the capacity of a quasi-private function, perhaps the norms for governing the institution that would apply in the private case ought to predominate.
But that same principle can be used to justify the use of public funds to create public institutions that do things that we manifestly have decided public institutions are not supposed to do. My statement above could be used to justify publicly funded religious indoctrination for example. Which I think would be bad.
Still, it seems that it ought to be possible to have the state employ people and impose restrictions or guideline on their work requirements/functions that are conducive to the achievement of the work mission, even when such constraints are not otherwise permitted on citizen as such. That is to say, this professor wasn’t being denied free speech rights as a citizen, but rather wasn’t being allowed to use the time paid for by taxpayers to engage in activities contrary to what his boss/organization requires of anyone in the role, irrespective of who that person is and their particulars of religious belief or whatnot.