https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/trial-by-combat
It is interesting how the mistakes in the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 seem to have shaped their approach to Ukraine. The first intelligence that Russia was going to invade Ukraine was gathered in October, 2021.
Biden's national security team was particularly concerned about the mistakes in 2014 with Crimea and the Donbas, which is why they decided to be so public with the intelligence.
Of note it details the decision-making around sending cluster munitions to Ukraine. It was not the first choice. The US first considered increasing artillery shell production, but discovered that it would not be sufficient in time. Then the Administration tried to convince Israel and South Korea to transfer their stockpiles. But Ukraine was going through artillery shells at a faster pace than anticipated, so the US decided to send cluster munitions as a stop-gap to avoid a complete halt to the Ukrainian war effort.
Also it reveals how Olaf Scholz was the main obstacle to a clear NATO invitation to Ukraine at the Vilnius summit. Scholz was even opposed to exempting Ukraine from the MAP requirement, but Biden convinced him to accept it.