Section 2
The physical, chemical, functional characteristics and phenomenological characteristics of mental states (certain type of nerve cells configurations) co-occur with stimulations by things out there, in the world.
There are then two things: a conceptual distinction thus made (between phenomenology and access) maps different things in the world, phenomenology and access. However, the phenomenology of mental states like sensations and experiences (and mental states like the phenomenological elements of attitudes) remain to be cerebrally characterized. The so-called hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers (1995), Churchland (2005), Clark (1993, 2000), Lloyd (1995, 1996), Mangan (1993), Opie and O'Brien (1999, 2001), Block (2011), Fahrenfort and Lamme (2012).
The physical, chemical and functional characteristics of mental states (certain type of nerve cells configurations) co-occur with stimulations by things out there, in the world.
There is then only one thing: a conceptual distinction thus made (between phenomenology and access) do not maps separate things in the world, there is only access (i. e., phenomenology cannot be separated from its functional characteristics). The so-called easy problem of consciousness. Baars (2002, 2003), Cohen and Dennett (2011), Crick (1984), Crick and Koch (1997), Dehaene and Naccache (2001), Dennett (1991, 1993, 2001), Kouider et al. (2007, 2012), Naccache and Dehaene (2007), Rosenthal (1993), Weiskrantz (1998).
The so-called Broca's aphasia is physically characterized typically by occupying the inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis and a small posterior segment of pars triangularis), in the left hemisphere. Corresponds to the Brodmann (1909) area 44 and to the edges of areas 6, 12, 45 and 47. And is functionally characterized typically by: production disruptions (effortful joint and telegraphic speech and ungrammatical); speech and writing disorders (but understanding of spoken and written language).
The so-called Wernicke aphasia, in turn, is physically characterized typically by occupying the posterior segment of the superior temporal gyrus, in its back side, just behind the so-called gyrus of Heschl and before the angular gyrus. Corresponds to the Brodmann (1909) areas 22, 37, 39 and 40. And is functionally characterized typically by: affected understanding capacity, with seemingly fluent production, but with poor or empty content discourse; strongly affected readability.
The co-occurrence of nerve cell activity with our language production system have been supposedly well characterized physically and functionally: the Broca's area co-occur with the syntactic-articulatory component of language; the Wernicke's area co-occur with the lexical-semantic component of language.
Knowledge of nerve cell configurations co-occurred with stimulations by things out there is still very fragmented, with each new study about physical, chemical and functional characteristics leave behind more questions than answers, the answers are still about very small parts of the brain.
For example, aphasia associated this area, the Broca's area, after all it involves areas of the brain most extensive and detailed than the area typically designated by that term, "Broca". This idea is sufficiently documented in Dronkers et al. (2007) and I just want to point out that the relationships between Broca's aphasia and brain's area are still studied today by many researchers and clinicians (Dronkers et al. 2007 mentions some).
One lesson these modern studies is that Broca's aphasia is caused by wider brain injury area than the Broca's area: cerebral cortex, the so-called white matter, the insula, basal gland and portions of the anterior superior temporal gyrus. For these authors (see Dronkers et al. 2007) these data show that behind Broca's area, those brain areas are also involved in the production of speech.
Presumably, the combined study of language and of the brain would generate progress in one or both of the following domains: the study of the brain reveal aspects of the structure of linguistic knowledge and/or the study of language reveal aspects of the nature of brain cell activity.
However, in the current state of the so-called neurolinguistic, no research has advanced the understanding neither of linguistic theory neither of neuroscience. At least, in significantly explanatory manner.
In general, are more explanations that we need than explanations that we have. For this reason, according to its critics (Poeppel 1996, Poeppel and Embick 2005), the underlying interdisciplinarity research program Linguistics-Neuroscience may well become sterile.
Most recently, related to fMRI inferences, see Eklund et al. (2016), whose “results question the validity of a number of fMRI studies and may have a large impact on the interpretation of weakly significant neuroimaging results”.
However, see Iyengar (2016) and Mumford et al. (2016). The media attention has been based on a misunderstanding and an “inflated” interpretation of Eklund et al. (2016) results and the following correction has been published:
in the Significance Statement, lines 9–11, “These results question the validity of some 40,000 fMRI studies and may have a large impact on the interpretation of neuroimaging results” should instead appear as “These results question the validity of a number of fMRI studies and may have a large impact on the interpretation of weakly significant neuroimaging results”;
on page 7904, left column, fifth full paragraph, lines 1–3, “It is not feasible to redo 40,000 fMRI studies, and lamentable archiving and data-sharing practices mean most could not be reanalyzed either” should instead appear as “Due to lamentable archiving and data-sharing practices, it is unlikely that problematic analyses can be redone”.
As in physics and in microbiology go on, we are far from a Lucretius: but for example about attention, we are still telling what a Lucretius said about attention (more below, p. 23).
However, let us see what tells us Nagel (1998).
If there is a necessary relationship between phenomenology and physiology, for example, the experience of tasting chocolate, the need for this relationship is not evident a priori (only based on the concept of the experience of tasting chocolate).
The ownership of the concept of the experience of tasting chocolate, for example, by me, is the possession of the concept of a conscious experience, though I am not aware of anything about the brain.
The relationship between phenomenology and physiology, unlike behavioral bindings, it is completely absent from the concept of the experience of tasting chocolate and cannot be, so to speak, restored by philosophical analysis: the relation to the brain is hidden in the concept of the experience of tasting chocolate.
However, still according to Nagel (1998), if there is a necessary relationship between phenomenology and physiology, my possession of the concept of the experience of tasting chocolate requires that I have a brain and that my brain will be directly involved in my act of imagine empathically my mental state (even if the involvement of my brain is out of my concept of the experience of tasting chocolate).
It is appropriate here, related to imagination, reminded the following.
When we imagine something by representing it to ourselves, we can do it in two ways: either empathically or perceptually (as the symbolic imagination, Nagel 1998 excludes it from his considerations).
The imagination of phenomenological characteristics is empathic but the imagination of physical, chemical and functional characteristics is perceptual. It seems that we can imagine the phenomenological state without the physical, chemical and functional state but from the two types of imagination does not followed that phenomenological states and physical, chemical and functional states will not be identical.
When we imagine a mental state without the physical state of the brain co-occurring with it, we imagine that this physical state does not occur but it actually occurring. If it seems the opposite is because what we imagine in relation to the mental state we imagine it empathically and what we imagine in relation to the physical state we imagine it perceptually.
By other words, imagining a mental state contrasts with imagining a physical state in that the imagination of the mental state is empathy and the imagination of the physical state is perceptual. Imagining one's perception is empathy of his mental state and perceptual of his perception.
However, it is impossible that my brain will be directly involved in my act of empathetically imagine the mental state of tasting chocolate and not be in the co-occurring physical state.
Authors such as Cromwell and Panksepp (2011) argue that the improper and excessive use of concepts like the concepts of "cognitive" and "cognition" (as documented by the studies they have been pursued) may have delayed the understanding of "mind-central nervous system-world".
Improper and excessive, because cortical brain activity co-occur with cognitive mental states but the study of subcortical brain somatic-visceral activity co-occurring with "emotional control" such as anger, fear, lust may contribute to new treatments and medications for psychiatric disorders and neurobehavioral disorders.
Concepts like the concepts of "cognitive" and "cognition", related to a co-occurring brain activity, has not been nothing other than umbrella concepts (or concepts basket of trinkets), erroneously perceptually imagine (instead of empathetically imagine).
For them, as for myself, the research "mind-central nervous system-world" upon the cortical leaving out the subcortical (the alleged methodology metaphorically called “up-down”) delay the understanding of the mental since cognition is only a part of the mental. According to them, the research "mind-central nervous system-world" upon the subcortical and the cortical (the alleged methodology metaphorically called “bottom-up”), along with more precise concepts of the brain (everything is all mixed up, bottom to top and top to bottom and sideways, looping recurrent neural activity) may help guide the development of new therapies and more accurate ways to describe and explain the brain-behavior relations: after all, what we share with animals is more affective (analogously, phenomenology) than cognitive, and if animals have been used as models of human psychology, it is astonishing that the conclusions have tended to be cognitive but not affective (analogously, not phenomenological). We share life with animals: we are organisms of natural selection.
However, there have been more umbrella concepts beyond the concepts of "cognitive" and "cognition". What we want to point out is that the experts in their respective fields, perhaps passed the spell of the modern techniques of brain imaging (do not go to turn against the media wizards) are currently and finally reviewing the results obtained through these techniques, weigh the conclusions and clarify the concepts they once proposed about the brain. In addition to concepts like the concepts of "cognitive", "cognition" other umbrella concepts are the concepts of "binding" and "attention" (erroneously perceptually imagine instead of empathetically imagine), as has recently been published.
Thank you very much for reading, I hope to publish the remaining posts on the sixth day after the previous post (one post every sixth day, more or less).