The State as a Criminal Aggressor

["Soviet Symbol Isolated," by Vera Kratochvil, taken from PublicDomainPictures.Net; this image is in the public domain.]

This is a continuation of a previous post, "Criminality as a Thing in Itself." It, in turn, was a continuation of a previous post, "Classical Liberalism has Won the Debate."

Given that criminality, in its essence, entails a violation of the natural boundaries of human responsibility, and that responsibility is the natural outgrowth of human consciousness, and that, furthermore, criminality with respect to the state, in and of itself, is an arbitrary matter apart from issues of consciousness, we can say that criminality, in its essence, is wholly separable, as a matter of discourse, from state fiat dialectic. Because this is the case, it is now appropriate to assert that it is possible - indeed, probable - that the state itself may be a criminal actor.

What is a state in its essence? What statement can capture what it is to be a state apart from anything that may exclude any instance of it? Surely it is but three things:

1. It is an organization,
2. it is associated with a territory, and
3. it exercises a monopoly on fiat within the boundaries of its associated territory.

This general definition captures every possible instance of the state, including patriarchies, monarchies, oligarchies, democracies, constitutional republics, socialist dictatorships, and every variation and combination of the same, as well as any other state concept not included in that list. It also happens to be an accurate description of organized criminal gangs.

This, then, prompts the question: what is the difference between government and organized crime? It seems that the clear and simple answer is: nothing - at least in terms of basic essence. The government, sans any guiding principles that may underlie it is indistinguishable from an organized criminal group; and with respect to our exploration of the concept of criminality, this is very clear. Governments routinely exercise fiat to dominate and confiscate that which is within the natural boundaries of individuals' areas of responsibility. Person and property, from the perspective of entitlement generated by the exercise of consciousness, are absolutes. When the government regulates and taxes, it is violating those principles and is acting in a criminal manner. This is indisputable.

The question as to whether, from the perspective of criminality in its essence (as opposed to state fiat), the state can be a criminal organization, is not really up for debate, because it very obviously can be, and usually is. The only question with regards to this issue that may be up for debate is whether it is possible for the state to not be a criminal actor.

I would argue that, yes, it is possible for a state to not be criminal, but in order for that to be the case, it must be so narrowly constrained that the only model of the state that fits those constraints is classical liberalism. For the state to not be criminal, it must take the protection of the entitlements of the exercise of consciousness as its sole priority, which means it may not regulate or tax except as is absolutely necessary to support the protection of individuals' persons and property, which are the concrete entitlements that arise from the establishment of areas of responsibility that form within natural boundaries as a result of the exercise of consciousness. The only model of the state that does this is the one that conforms to the Lockean model. Therefore, Classical Liberalism has won the debate.