Continuation
From the point of view of the United States, there was also no reasonable explanation for the US open entry into the war. The considerations that had previously prompted Roosevelt to reject Churchill's calls to join the war, when France was defeated, still seemed weighty. Although a large majority of Americans finally became aware of the danger posed by the Axis Powers, opponents of entering the war still enjoyed great influence. Deciding on the war, Roosevelt wanted to win the unanimous support of the people. Meanwhile - and it was very important - the armed forces of the country remained unprepared.
It is better to wait, if the enemy allows it, and at the same time do everything possible to help the besieged England, thereby saving the chances of avoiding a hot war. Even if we declare war, it will take many months before the United States can do more than what has already been proposed under the Lend-Lease. The state of the armed forces convincingly confirmed this.
For the naval forces, when their leaders began to determine the needs of the fleet on the two oceans and received approval of their demands, including the introduction of a new class of the largest warships-aircraft carriers, the procurement problems were relatively easy, because government and civil shipyards could adapt to the requirements of a sustainable shipbuilding program. Another matter is the supply of the army and its ambitious appendage - the air force.
Given the rapid unfolding of events in the world, the requested appropriations were inadequate long before Congress approved them, and some calculations for others proved to be inadequate to the threat that increasingly loomed on the horizon. For example, in May 1940, the Air Force planned to have 41 air groups in its composition, but within two months this number was increased to 54 groups, which would provide air power to 5,000 combat aircraft and more than 200,000 officers and soldiers of this kind troops. In the fall of 1941, this figure was increased to 84 air groups with a total of 7,800 combat aircraft.
Fortunately, the congress was still not inclined to close the public purse. In June 1941, the House of Representatives Commission on Appropriations recommended allocating a record amount of $ 9.8 billion to the War Ministry, including an unprecedented case - to authorize the Chief of Staff of the Army to order, regardless of their cost, tanks and other equipment for creating armored forces. And to further demonstrate its generosity, the commission recommended allocating another $ 25 million to a special fund to cover any extraordinary expenses.
But even open checks and even special funds were useless, if there was nowhere and there was nothing to buy. Impeded by budgetary constraints, the artillery and technical administration of the army, the air force and the army agencies engaged in material and technical supplies, slowly developed prototypes of military equipment that would be required in the future to ensure victory in the Second World War.
Even where prototypes were already defined, it was difficult to foresee the proper appropriations and requirements for this product with certainty that would prompt the industry to re-equip the old ones and build new plants in order to meet the demand in the future. And if we take into account the demand for weapons that England, China, the countries of South America and later the Soviet Union took into account, the supply-demand management will be strikingly unbalanced.
The army, for example, initially chose the 105-mm howitzer to replace it with a 75-mm cannon; but the prospects for obtaining this new howitzer in the required quantity were so vague that the military leaders were forced to give their potential allies obsolete weapons of the times of the First World War.
Until the middle of 1940, when the war was already on fire in Europe, the president did not create any body to guide the industry. Even then, he refused to act in any degree with his extraordinary powers. Instead, he preferred to revive the National Defense Council, which consisted of the ministers of the six main ministries, and the advisory commission to this council, which operated during the First World War in accordance with a special law that was never abolished after the war. As soon as the council approved a consultative commission composed of the seven best-known leaders, Roosevelt was ready to nullify the role of the council.
Due to the lack of firm decisions during 1940, little has been done to streamline military production even after the end of the year the president created a special group within the framework of the advisory commission to determine the priority of fulfilling military orders. Only at the very beginning of 1941, Roosevelt took some steps to settle military production. He established a production management department headed by the Industrial Policy Council, which included: director William Knudsen of General Motors, co-director Sidney Gilman of the Congress of Production Unions and two members - the War Minister Henry Stimpson and the Minister of the Navy, Franks Knox.
Then during 1941, 1942, and during some period of 1943, there was a uniform reproduction of organs with extraordinary powers, organs of the most diverse origin, genesis, purpose and longevity. Almost every aspect of the life and development of the country's economy has been under the control of this or that body, sometimes even several simultaneously.
Until 1943, when the president finally established a real master - the management of the military industrial mobilization, led by Supreme Court member James Byrnes, all the bodies were subordinate to the leadership of the leadership of the country in emergency conditions. The President could coordinate, supervise and even personally direct the work of any body connected with activities in emergency conditions.
When the last year of the pre-war preparations arrived, the organizational structure of the higher commanding unit remained in the army as if the conditions for the First World War were to be repeated. This structure included a scheme of the so-called headquarters of the main command, developed in 1921, according to which the military operational planning department was created.
The officers of this department, as was envisaged, will, in time of war, form the core of the headquarters of the main command, similar to the field headquarters of Pershing in France. It was assumed that with the outbreak of hostilities the chief of staff of the army would assume the leadership of the headquarters of the main command. In July 1940, such a headquarters of the main command actually began to function, led by Brig. General Leslie McNair, who acted as the chief of staff of the command.
At the time, it was believed that the headquarters of the main command would eventually create something like a new American expeditionary force, similar to Pershing's; but initially its role was limited only to the organization of training troops.