The Origins and Blame for the July Crisis of 1914

    In assigning blame for the outbreak of a full-scale continental war in Europe at the end of the July Crisis, the answer doesn’t hinge upon which nation or party was responsible for the crisis itself, but upon the reactions from the other powers that came afterwards. As Samuel Williamson Jr. and Russel van Wyk establish in the Introduction of July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War, “the final decisions for war might rest with the monarchs, but public opinion and parliaments could not be ignored entirely”,[1] it is with this assumption that we examine the facts of the crisis and which party’s decisions were responsible for escalating it into a war. From this perspective Austria-Hungary was just as willing (if not eager) to use aggressive diplomacy and military action as any other power on the continent, and was also prepared to execute this force more readily than the other powers. In the complicated and rickety structure of alliances across Europe that had formed over the past four decades, Vienna pulled the most weight on the path to the opening of the Great War in August 1914. 

    The legislative powers of Serbia had not made the decision to kill Archduke Ferdinand, a small group of terrorists were the culprits. In fact, the Serbian Government was aware of the subversive actions of General Dragutin Dimitrijevic and his Black Hand terrorist group. Efforts were actively made by other members of the government to curb their shady maneuvers. Serbian Minister of the Interior Stojan Prosic tried to thwart the group’s efforts to smuggle guns and bombs into Bosnia,[2] and had also issued an order to stop the conspirators at the border on their way to Sarajevo. However, “the frontier ‘authorities’ themselves belonged to the organization, and did not carry out Stojan’s instructions.”[3] Despite the fact that the assassination was orchestrated by an organization which had worked its way into the military structure of Serbia, and that the Serbian press was sympathetic to the conspiracy[4], the assassination was the work of a small group of conspirators acting independently of and against the state and therefore not an act of war by Serbia. 

    What separated the crisis of 1914 from the Albanian Crisis the previous year was that in 1913 Serbia relented to Austro-Hungarian demands and evacuated from Albania. However, Serbia was not given this opportunity in 1914. The ultimatum issued to Belgrade was an immediate threat to Serbian institutions such as the press, military, and even public schools. Moreover, the demands that certain members of the military and administration be arrested and that Habsburg troops be allowed into Serbia to assist in the apprehension and trial of the conspirators threatened Serbian sovereignty.[5] The leaders in Vienna had been itching for war with Serbia and regarded the assassination of the heir to the throne as especially heinous.

    Members of the Austro-Hungarian Government had anticipated a war in the Balkans for years prior to the July Crisis. Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf was one of its main advocates. As revealed in letters to his mistress, Gina von Reininghaus, he believed he had a personal duty to be victorious in war in order to marry her, “If I come,… crowned with success, then Gina, I will break all restraints in order to…have you as my dear wife.”[6] In his correspondence with Count Leopold Berchthold during the Balkan crisis in 1913, he insisted upon military action against Serbia at the risk of losing the respect of the rest of the European powers.[7] The Assassination had provided the perfect opportunity for Habsburg military leaders to gain personal and professional prestige by way of war.  

    With the “blank check” from Germany, guaranteeing military support and securing an invaluable ally against Serbia and its allies, and the blessing from Emperor Franz Joseph, The Austro-Hungarian ministers except for Hungarian premier Count István Tisza were ready to move against Serbia. In the Minutes of the Common Ministerial Council on July 7, all those present except the Hungarian Prime minister believed that military action was necessary. The Austro-Hungarian ministers explicitly stated in the meeting that “the most far-reaching demands must be made of Serbia in order to assure a rejection, which would then open the way to the radical solution of a military attack.”[8] In the meeting, retaliation from Russia was also taken into consideration. Russia would mobilize its army on July 30 in response to Vienna’s actions, It should be noted that Vienna differentiated between mobilization and actual war when placing blame. Although mobilization certainly escalated the crisis, it was not the equivalent of declaring war.  The Austro-Hungarian plans had fully anticipated a full-scale continental war; yet was still insistent upon a military response against Serbia and on July 28 declared war on Serbia. 

    Although all of the European powers postured themselves in different ways in response to the crisis as a way of protecting their images among their allies, populations and adversaries, Austria-Hungary was the one power which was intent upon following through. The rejection of the ultimatum by Serbia, Russia’s general mobilization, and Germany’s pledge to assist Austria-Hungary were more gestures than anything else. Austria-Hungary was intent upon expanding its influence in Europe and convened in July of 1914 to seize upon this opportunity. 

   [1] Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk, July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Brief Documentary History (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003),2  

 [2] Stojan Protic, “Letter to Nikola Pasic.” In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Brief Documentary History ed. Samuel R. Williams Jr. and Russel Van Wyk (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003), 27   

[3] Ljuba Jovanovic, “On Belgrade’s Knowledge of the Conspiracy.” In July 1914 ed. Samuel R. Williams Jr. and Russel Van Wyk (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003), 26   

[4] The Pijémont, “Serbian Press Comment.” In July 1914, ed. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s 2003),32   

[5] “The Habsburg Ultimatum to Serbia.” In July 1914, ed. Samuel R. Williams Jr. and Russel Van Wyk (Boston/St. Martin’s, 2003), 26   

[6] Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, “Letter to Gina von Reininghaus.” In July 1914, ed. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk, 49   

[7] Franz Conrad Von Hötzendorf, “Letter to Gina von Reininghaus.” And “Extract of Ministerial Meeting.” In July 1914, ed. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russell Van Wyk, 52-54 

[8] “Minutes of the Common Ministerial Council” in July 1914, ed. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk (Boston/St. Martin’s 2003), 65