Its a traditional doctrine that whenever we intensively desire something, we think that thing is good for us

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In any common comprehension of good, an additional step is taken on the off chance that you go from saying that you need something or have chosen to seek after it to stating that it is good, or that it is good that you ought to have it. The possibility of something's by and large good imports a thought, however insignificant or dim, of a point of view in which it can be recognized by more than one agent as good.

An agent who just has a specific reason may obviously imagine that his motivation is good, yet he doesn't need to. The most he would submit himself to simply by having a reason would probably be that it would be good for him in the event that he prevailing in it, yet should even this much be included? Indeed, even this humble claim suggests a point of view that goes some place past the agent's quick needs, to his more drawn out term interests.

To value something, even generally to your own particular interests, as you do in suspecting that it would be better, is dependably to go past only needing something. We may without a doubt come to put all the value in our life into the satisfaction of one desire, however in the event that we did, it would not just in light of the fact that we had just a single desire.

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Simply to have one desire may well be to have no value in our life, to discover all the value in one desire is to have only one desire that issues to us. Regardless of whether we surrender the customary doctrine, with the goal that we don't need to see all that we need as good, it may in any case be genuine that we should see our freedom as good.

Good for us, we proposed, acquaints some reference with our interests that goes past our quick purposes, and freedom is one of our central interests. So maybe we should see our own particular freedom as a good. In any case, provided that this is true, we should not be deceived into suspecting that our freedom constitutes a good. This would be so just on the off chance that it were a good, that we ought to be an objective agent, and there is no motivation behind why others should consent to that.

Truth be told, it isn't evident that we need to consent to it. This starts to address some more profound inquiries concerning the origination of our own existence. Everything said so far in regards to the essential conditions and presuppositions of balanced action is by all accounts redress. The argument that tries to give an establishment to morality endeavors to demonstrate that, just as a result of those conditions, every agent is associated with a moral duty.

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Every agent, as indicated by this argument, must think as takes after. Since we essentially need our fundamental freedom, we should be against courses of action that would expel it. Subsequently we can't consent to any course of action of things by which others would have the right to expel our essential freedom. So when we ponder what course of action of things we fundamentally require, we see that we should guarantee a right to our essential freedom.

Essentially, we should lay it down when in doubt for others, that they regard our freedom. We assert this right exclusively in light of the fact that we are a sound agent with purposes. Yet, in the event that this reality alone is the premise of our claim, at that point a comparative certainty should similarly be the premise of such a claim by others.

On the off chance that we honestly and fittingly believe that they should regard our freedom, at that point we should perceive that they really and suitably surmise that we should regard their freedom. In moving from our requirement for freedom to they should not to meddle with us, we should similarly move from their need to we should not to meddle with them.

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References:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desire
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_desire
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201411/the-problem-desire