The Limits of the Sargon Opinion

Likewise, there are parallels between Sargon and Kumho Tire. Kumho Tire's central holding is that the foundational requirement for a showing of reliability applies to every species of expertise, even if the expert labels the expertise "non-scientific." Justice Chin's opinion makes no distinction between the various types of expertise. The gatekeeping standards prescribed in Sargon apply across the board to any expert testimony.
Although there are commonalities between Sargon and Daubert and Kumho Tire, the most striking parallel is to Joiner. Joiner empowered trial judges to assess the aptness of the analogy between the conditions in the empirical studies cited by the expert small business lawyers https://california-business-lawyer-corporate-lawyer.com/california-business-lawyer/california-small-business-lawyer/ and the facts of the pending case. In Sargon, the trial judge conducted such an assessment. Justice Chin enumerated the "objective business measures," such as the number of employees and sales representatives that the judge concluded distinguished Sargon from the Big Six corporations Skorheim had analogized to. (Sargon, 55 Cal.4th at p. 778.) Just as the Joiner judge properly concluded the animal studies were "dissimilar to the facts presented in" that case (522 U.S. at p. 143), the Sargon judge correctly decided "Sargon was dissimilar to all of the Big Six."
The Limits of theSargon Opinion
In Sargon, the California Supreme Court took a major stride toward joining the ranks of the majority of states subscribing to Dau­ bert. However, there are two respects in which Sargon differs from the federal approach.
First, Sargon expressly states that in California, the Frye standard still governs the admissibility of "new scientific techniques" (Sargon, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772, fn. 6) - raising the possibility that when a proponent offers testimony about a novel, instrumental, purportedly scientific theory or technique, the testimony must run the gauntlet of Frye as well as Sargon.
Second, a close reading of Sargon demonstrates that when Justice Chin described the nature of the inquiry under Sargon, he did not go as far as Justice Blackmun. Justice Chin stated that trial judges should conduct "a circumscribed inquiry" to "determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information cited by the experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert's general theory or technique is valid." (Sargon, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) Justice Chin quoted that language directly from a law review article we authored (Imwinkelried & Faigman (2009) Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the California Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loy.L.A. L.Rev. 427), which was based on an amicus brief we submitted in Lockheed. That article contended that under Evidence Code section 802, the court could accord trial judges the power to make a "sufficiency" determination, that is, whether "as a matter of logic" the empirical data justifies or warrants the expert's final opinion (Id. at 449.) Sargon embraced this contention. In Daubert, however, Justice Blackmun stated that federal judges make their decision under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), authorizing judges to weigh the credibility of the foundational testimony. Sargon does not cite. Evidence Code section 405, California's counterpart to ,federal Rule 104(a). Thus, Sargon stops short of authorizing as probing an inquiry as Daubert. Courts may eventually go that far. However, we are not there yet.