Strap on your seat-belt, because this one's about to be a bumpy ride.
This debate puts the skeptical hypothesis into question and brings a couple different philosophical viewpoints into discussion with each other. In particular, Pryor’s moderate anti-skeptical approach will be discussed in relationship with the skeptical argument towards forming beliefs on the basis of perception justification.
This paper argues for the thesis that Pryor’s moderate-skeptical ‘diffusion’ of skepticism fails, allowing the skeptical conclusion to hold. First, a valid skeptical argument in terms of perceptual justification of belief will be laid out. Then, Pryor’s counter-argument to the conclusion of this skeptical argument will be explained. Finally, the interplay between these two arguments will be evaluated in order to justify the thesis claim.
Here is a skeptical argument arguing for the conclusion that we have do not have justification to form beliefs on the basis of perception.
- We have justification to form beliefs on the basis of perception only if we have independent justification to believe that our perception is reliable.
- We cannot have independent justification to believe perception is reliable.
- So, we do not have justification to form beliefs on the basis of perception.
This argument shown to be valid by modus tollens, yet its conclusion has implications that very few people are willing to accept.
If a valid argument leads to a questionable conclusion, the argument may be shown to be faulty by demonstrating that it is unsound. Pryor engages in the discussion by rejecting premise (1) of the skeptical argument. He thinks that we don’t need independent justification of our perception to consider it reliable. He does this by employing a view called dogmatism: he thinks that a belief derived from sensory information is immediately justified, thus entirely skipping this ‘independent justification’ requirement stipulated by the skeptic. In short, “the dogmatism about perceptual justification says that when it perceptually seems to you as if p is the case, you have a kind of justification for believing p that does not presuppose or rest on your justification for anything else, which could be cited in an argument (...) for p” (p. 519).
Pryor believes that our perception is immediately justified simply by nature of having the perception. This means that he sees perceptual information as prima facie justified. He does add that it is prima facie in a defeasible sense; it is prima facie justified until changed in light of new information. “The mere having of a justified belief that p & q is enough for your justification for believing p to be in place. Similarly , the dogmatist think that the mere having of an experience as of p is enough for your perceptual justification for believing p to be in place.” (p. 519). Pryor thinks that seeing perception as a valid justification for belief is a notion that is innocent until proven guilty. Skepticism, on the other hand, asserts something so outrageous that it does not have this same initial innocence. In short, Pryor thinks that “the skeptic needs some reason to require us to know that we’re not being deceived, and to know this antecedently to knowing anything on the basis of perception”. This states that the burden of justification is on the skeptic because his assumptions are more demanding than the assumption made by the dogmatist.
There are several ways to tackle Pryor’s dogmatism, each of which specifies a different shortcoming of the view.
First of all, Pryor is asserting that a-priori contingent justification (not in the weak sense that Kripke uses in other papers) is possible. Moreover, he asserts that perception is known a-priori in virtue of having the experience in the first place. A-priori contingent justification is controversial topic that should not be taken lightly in the way that Pryor does in his paper. Instead of simply assuming its possibility by giving some weak suggestive examples Pryor should be giving this question serious attention.
Secondly, another philosopher, Stewart Cohen, claims that dogmatism licenses illegitimate bootstrapping. If you ask a question, the answer of which you already know, you are not uncovering any new information. Consequently, no justificatory work is done. Cohen builds a strong case to show that assuming perceptually based beliefs to be immediately justified requires you to previously assume that your perception has the ability to justify belief. How can a claim have any value if it assumes itself for argumentative gains? Dogmatism fails to explain what is wrong with illegitimate bootstrapping which leaves a large gap in Pryor’s reasoning.
Thirdly, dogmatism cannot explain the issue with Moore’s argument. Although Pryor uses dogmatism to support a conclusion similar to Moore’s, his support is based on completely different notions. Pryor claims that we can simply assume our perception to be a reliable source of justification, whereas Moore claims that the skeptic about the external world is wrong. In one sense, these points serve a very similar purpose. In another sense, however, Pryor is simply begging his question against Moore’s. Instead of explaining what is wrong with Moore’s argument Pryor just suggests an alternate viewpoint which avoids these issues.
How do the objections support the thesis of this paper? Objecting to Pryor’s solution implies that his Dogmatist approach does not have moderate anti-skeptical success.
Firstly, Pryor seems to be assuming hotly debated philosophical topics. Secondly, Pryor fails to address the issue of illegitimate bootstrapping. Thirdly, Pryor’s objection does not adequately deal with Moore’s argument and leaves his intellectual grapples unanswered. These three concerns combined demonstrate that Pryor’s ‘diffusion’ of skepticism is insufficient. Therefore, we have justification to form beliefs on the basis of perception only if we have independent justification to believe that perception is reliable until Pryor builds a stronger case.
Sources
Pryor, James. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist." Nous 34.4 (2000): 517-49. Web.
Cohen, Stewart. "Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, And A Priori Justification."Philosophical Perspectives 24.1 (2010): 141-59. Web.