On Schopenhauer’s Mysticism and Fatalism

On the Sufferings of the World is one of Schopenhauer’s most famous essays, and rightfully so. It shows both the metaphysical and ethical elements of his philosophy. It is also an introduction to his Fatalism which is one of the key traits of his political philosophy. It begins as an exploration of the sufferings of life, which he rightly finds to be immense, numerous in number and in a general sense inevitable. Meaning that though this or that misfortune could be prevented, suffering as a whole cannot. He segways from topic to topic but the three main portions of the essay are an examination of our plight; our plight when compared to animals; and the proper ethics of life considering the impossibility of a happy life. The first portion deserves no special attention, but the second and third should be dissected to see if they are correct.
Schopenhauer on the whole holds that people are metaphysically and biologically the same as animals. The only difference is in degree or quantity of material which produces qualitative differences. Meaning because we are a higher manifestation of his will and because we have more complex nervous systems with larger brains, we can experience pleasures and pains the “brutes” cannot. Also, consequently, we have more needs, though they are largely psychological, for like Rousseau he admits that people in a directly physical sense need very little, the difference being that Schopenhauer argues these needs are inevitable from human nature while Rousseau would find they come about from entering Civil Society. The main point for Schopenhauer is that our lives are more unfortunate than animals because if the aim of life is contentment, which he rightly describes as freedom from pain and negative in nature, then animals seem both pre-disposed to it while we are pre-disposed to boredom and need to exert far less effort and emotional vexation to attain what they desire.
Humans and animals for Schopenhauer ultimately desire the same things by necessity, which I think is perhaps the first area where one can rightly find error. Socrates writes that a virtuous man eats and drinks only to live while worthless men live only to eat and drink. By this standard it seems that Schopenhauer would conclude all of humanity, with perhaps a few exceptions, are worthless. This isn’t highly surprising for those who have read Schopenhauer’s misanthropic writings, particularly the one entitled On Human Nature. But Socrates it seems highlights the capacity of humans to aspire towards non-hedonic goals and endeavors. One could argue, that though humans intrinsically find physical pleasure to be pleasant, they do not inevitably pursue physical pleasure to the exclusion of all things. They can aspire to both better themselves and to act to improve the lives of others. This is where one’s position on Schopenhauer is contingent upon whether they agree with his Fatalism derived from his metaphysics. For Schopenhauer our intellect and character are given to us upon inception. There is very little to do in life after one is born except to live out our lives as our nature dictates.
We will inevitably suffer, not only from the results of our actions but from our metaphysical nature. He writes: there is nothing more certain than the general truth that it is the grievous sin of the world which has produced the grievous suffering of the world. I am not referring here to the physical connection between these two things lying in the realm of experience; my meaning is metaphysical. This is perhaps the most succinct example of Schopenhauer’s mysticism. His philosophy in numerous ways attempts to use empirical data to justify certain claims, but on the whole it is based on presumptions which are not argued properly if at all.
His belief that it is the sin of the world which causes the suffering of the world conflicts with both his belief that it is justifiable for us to suffer but not non-human animals or that animals have a life that is tranquil despite moments of intense fear or pain. If they are tranquil, then they are not suffering in the world, and cannot be a part of the sin of existence, which they are if we assume Realism which Schopenhauer does. One can point towards excerpts where he highlights the ways in which the life of animals is not tranquil, and one can attempt to argue that we are of such a higher level of will that it is understandable that the animals will be spared of much of our suffering. Despite this justification, it does appear that non-human animals can meet all of their needs and be content for long stretches of time which is Schopenhauer’s conception of a good life.
If we and the “brutes” are metaphysically the same, it seems odd to attempt to justify our suffering but not of other animals. He writes: … nay, you will find that everything is as it should be, in a world where each of us pays the penalty of existence in his own peculiar way. But if our suffering is the “penalty of existence” then how could our suffering be excusable or even correct while a deer or tigers is not? We act out of egoism just as the deer or tiger does, if anything, humans are capable of forms of compassion that most other animals are not. We have higher agency, so arguably we can realize we shouldn’t be this way, but especially for a Fatalist like Schopenhauer, there is a stark difference between understanding something and being able to change it. Is the suffering of our sin justifiable solely because we are conscious enough to not be ignorant of it?
Schopenhauer is a brilliant philosopher who points out the many errors in life. He rightfully grounds ethics in satisfying needs rather than moral desert, and his description of people is largely accurate. However, his metaphysical premises are lacking in any serious argumentation and his Fatalism is consequently lacking in any serious evidence outside of anecdote and using religious concepts as allegory. He furthers Kantian ethics in viewing the motive of an action is of significance while the consequences hold no bearing while replacing duty with compassion. He lacks anything outside of a purely descriptive portrayal of moral passions, meaning his arguments cannot be said to hold normative significance. This, however, is for the best for a philosopher who believes we could not change our behavior to satisfy this ought even if we could know it.