Aristotle: Physics I
(Resume)
Chapter 1
Physics is defined as the science of nature , and there is only science where there is knowledge of principles, causes and elements. Therefore, we must determine, in the first place, what is relative to its principles. For this it is necessary to direct the investigation from what is more knowable and clearer for us towards what is clearer and more knowable by nature . This means proceeding analytically from things as a whole to their particular constituents.
Episode 2
There needs to be either one principle or several. If there is only one principle, then either it will be stationary, as Parmenides and Melissus say , or it will be in motion, as physicists say. But if the principles are several, they will either be finite or infinite. If they are finite, they will be two, three, four, or some other number; if they are infinite, they will either belong to a single genus, differing only in figure, or they will be different or even contrary in kind. Those who seek how many entities there really are proceed in the same way, since they also investigate whether the principles or elements are one or many.
Now, examine whether what is it is one and motionless, it is not an examination of physics. Indeed, it is not up to the physicist to discuss the theses about what belongs to Heraclitus, Melissus or Parmenides. We, for our part, assume that entities by nature, or all or some, are in motion. This is evident from experience. And although we are not obliged to refute all adverse arguments, the thesis of Parmenides and Melissus pose important problems of a physical order. Hence, perhaps it is appropriate to say something about it, since this examination is of interest to philosophy.
Since what is is said in many ways, the most appropriate starting point will be to investigate in what sense they say that all things are a unity. Is it that they are all substances or quantities or qualities? Perhaps they are a single substance, or a single quality? These alternatives are very different and it is not possible to affirm them at the same time, since in that case there would be many entities. On the other hand, if Melissus claims that what is is infinite, then it would be a quantity, since the infinite is infinite in quantity, not in substance or quality. But if it were a substance and a quantity, what it is would be two and not one.
Furthermore, since the self is said in many ways, as what it is , it must be examined in what way the whole is said to be one . Something is said to be one if it is continuous, or if it is indivisible, or if the definition of its essence is one and the same. However, the whole cannot be one because it is continuous, since the continuous is infinitely divisible; nor can it be one because it is indivisible, since nothing will have quantity or quality; in short, all entities cannot be one because they have the same definition, because then one returns to the doctrine of Heraclitus, and all things would not be a unity, but nothing.
As for the ancients closest to us, they avoided using the "is" in order to evade the fact that the one became multiple. They also did not see that one and what is has multiple meanings; since entities are many either by definition or by division, and the same thing can be one and multiple without opposition.
Chapter 3
Thus, proceeding in this way, it seems impossible that the entities are a unit, and the arguments used to prove it are not difficult to refute. Indeed, both Parmenides and Melissus make eristic arguments. Meliso , on the one hand, commits a fallacy, because he thinks that if "everything that is generated had a beginning", "what is not generated does not have one". And it is also absurd to suppose that everything has a beginning, not of time, but of the thing; and this not only as regards the absolute generation, but also as regards the generation of a quality. Also, if what is it is one , why does it have to be immobile? Lastly, what is cannot be one in terms of form, but only in terms of matter.
Parmenides, on the other hand, can receive the same objections, although there are also others that can be more properly applied to him. Indeed, it supposes that what is is only said in an absolute sense, since it has many senses; and from this one could not distinguish between the white and that to which it belongs. Therefore, its premises are false and its conclusions do not follow. Necessarily, then, Parmenides assumes not only that what is has a single meaning, but also that it means what properly is and what is properly one . However, what is , in that case, cannot be an attribute. Now, if it is accepted that what properly is is not an attribute of something, why should it mean what it is rather than what it is not ? Because if what properly is not only is but is also white , then what properly is is not. In addition to this, what it really is cannot have magnitude, since the being of each one of its parts would be different.
It is also evident from the point of view of the definition that what properly is is divisible into others that properly are . Thus, if man were what he really is , animals and bipeds would also have to be what he really is . Because, if they were not, then they would be attributes of man or some other subject. But both alternatives are impossible, if one understands by attribute : either that which may or may not belong to a subject, or that to which the definition of the subject of which it is an attribute belongs.
Finally, some have given us both arguments: that all things are one, because what is means one thing, thereby granting that what is not is ; and that of the dichotomy, which supposes indivisible magnitudes. However, nothing prevents there from being, not an absolute non-being , but a certain non-being . Therefore, it is absurd to say that all things are one because there can be nothing outside of what is itself. Nothing, then, prevents entities from being many; and it is evidently impossible for what is to be one of this mode.
Chapter 4
As for the physicists, they speak in two ways. Some (Tales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Plato) establish that the one is the underlying body, from which all other things are generated, which are made multiple by rarefaction and condensation. Others (Anaximander, Empedocles and Anaxagoras) affirm that opposites are contained in the one and emerge from it by separation. Now, Anaxagoras thought that there are infinite similar particles, < homeomeric >, because he assumed the common opinion among physicists that nothing comes to be from what it is not , which led them to say: "all things were together"; moreover, the reciprocal generation of opposites led them to suppose that they must have already existed in each other. And, if everything that has to come from what is , they thought that things came from already existing things. That is why they said that everything is mixed in everything, assuming that the nature of a thing is what it seems to possess preponderantly.
But if infinity as infinity is unknowable, infinity as quantity or quality will also be unknowable. And if the principles were infinite according to number and according to form, it would be impossible to know what is composed of them, because we think we know a compound only when we know what its components are and how many.
Furthermore, if the parts of a thing could be of any size in greatness or smallness ("parts" as the components into which the whole can be divided), then necessarily the whole thing could be of any size. But if it is impossible for an animal or a plant to be of any size in greatness or in smallness, it is evident that neither can any of its parts be, because if it were not so, the whole would also be.
It is evident, moreover, that every thing cannot be present in every thing, since every finite body is exhausted by the repeated subtraction of a finite magnitude. On the other hand, if every body from which something is taken must necessarily become smaller, it is manifest that no body can be separated from the least amount of what is made. Thus, a complete separation will never take place, it is true, although Anaxagoras says it without knowing why: because the affections are inseparable. Hence, this Intelligence (Nous) that it postulates is absurd and impossible, since it intends to separate what is not separable.
Anaxagoras does not correctly conceive the generation of things of the same species either. Because in one sense mud can be broken down into chunks of mud, but in another sense it can't. Neither water and air are and engender each other in the same way that bricks come from the house or the house of bricks. Therefore, it would be better to conceive of a smaller and more finite number of principles, as Empedocles does.
Chapter 5
They all put opposites as principles, both those who affirm that the whole is one and immobile, and those who speak of the rare and dense. And this with good reason: for it is necessary that the principles do not come from one another, nor from other things, but that all things come from them. As for the first opposites, this corresponds to them: they do not come from other things, because they are first, nor from one another, because they are opposites. But how this happens, we must also examine it with reason.
It must be assumed that, among all the entities, there is none that by its own nature can act on something or suffer something random by virtue of something random, and that any entity cannot become the property of any other, unless it is consider by accident. Nor is any one primarily destroyed in any other. And this reasoning applies to both simple and compound things, but since we do not have a name for the opposite arrangements, in the case of the latter, it falls into oblivion.
Now, if this is true, everything that comes to be comes from its opposite or something in between, and everything that is destroyed is destroyed in its opposite or something in between. In addition, intermediates also come from opposites. Consequently, all entities that come to be by nature are either opposites or come from opposites.
Our predecessors have accompanied us thus far in asserting, as if constrained by truth itself, that the principles are contrary, though they have given no reason. Although some understand contraries as more knowable by reason, and others as more knowable by sensation, all speak of principles as contraries.
Chapter 6
It now remains to say whether the principles are two or three or more. It is not possible that there is a single principle, since opposites are not the same thing. Nor can they be infinite, for the following reasons: what is would not be knowable; in each gender there is only one contrariety and the substance is a single gender; it is possible and moreover preferable to start from a finite number; and, finally, the principles must not be prior or posterior to each other, but must always remain. It is evident, then, that they can be neither one nor infinite.
But if they are finite, there are certain reasons not to suppose that the contraries are only two: it would be difficult to perceive how by their own nature one acts on the other; we do not see that opposites are the substance of anything; a substance cannot be made up of non-substances. Therefore, if these arguments are admitted as true, it is necessary to suppose a third principle. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that there can be no single element, nor more than two or three. But it is difficult to decide if there are two or three.
Chapter 7
We are going to talk now, in the first place, of every generation, since it is according to nature to speak first of what is common and then examine what is particular.
We say, then, that something becomes something else when we refer either to simple [terms] (" man becomes a musician " or "the non-musical becomes a musician ") or to compounds (" man does not become a musician"). -musician can become a musician man »). But in one of these cases we say not only: "this comes to be", but also: "this comes to be from this" ("the musician comes to be from the non-musician"), although not in all cases. And when we say that something simple becomes, in one case that something remains ( man ) and in another it does not ( non-musician ).
In making these determinations, if someone gazes in as we have said, we reach this: there must always be something underlying what comes to be, and it, though one in number, is not one in form. In addition, our way of speaking shows that «to become» is said in many senses: in some cases it is not spoken of becoming, but of becoming a this , and only substances are said to come to be in the meaning absolute. It is clear, then, that in any case there must be something underlying.
As for the substances that come to be, they do so either by transfiguration, or by addition, or by subtraction, or by composition, or by alteration, and starting from a substratum. Therefore it is evident that everything that comes to be is compound, and there is not only something that comes to be, but something that comes to be this , and the latter in two ways: either as a substratum or as the opposite.
Therefore, if of the entities that are by nature there are causes and principles of those that primarily are and have come to be, then it is evident that everything comes into being from a substratum and a form. And though the substratum is one in number, but two in form; form is one, like order or music or any other similar determination. For this reason, in one sense it must be said that there are two principles and, in another, that there are three.
We have said, then, how many are the principles of becoming of natural entities and in what sense are they so many, and it is clear that there must be a substratum for the opposites and that there are two opposites. But, in another sense, this is not necessary, since it is enough for one of the opposites to effect the change by its absence or presence. As for this underlying nature, it is knowable by analogy, and although it is a principle, it is not one and is not a being in the way that a this is ; another principle is that of which there is a definition, and another also its opposite, deprivation.
Now, it is still not clear what the substance is, whether the form or the substrate. But that the principles are three, in what sense they are three and in what relation they are to each other, is evident. We have examined, then, how many are the principles and what are they.
Chapter 8
That only in this way can the difficulties of the ancients be resolved, we will now show. Faced with the opinion of those who first philosophized, according to which no entity can be generated or destroyed, since what is generated would have to become either what it is or what it is not , both alternatives being impossible, we say «to reach to be of what is or what is not », or « what is not or what is performs or undergoes some action, or becomes some this » is in no way different from the doctor who performs or undergoes some action, or of something that comes to be by the work of the doctor.
Like the ancients, we too affirm that nothing comes into being from what it is not , but this in an absolute sense, because somehow there is a coming into being from what is not , namely by accident; for a thing comes to be from privation, which by itself is not , not from a constituent of it. But this produces astonishment and it seems impossible for something to come to be like that, from what it is not . And in the same way we affirm that nothing comes to be from what it is , and that what is does not come to be, except by accident.
This, then, is one way of solving the difficulty. Another consists in speaking of the same thing with respect to its potentiality and with respect to its actuality. But, in this way, we said, the difficulties that forced them to make the deletions that we have spoken about are also resolved; for it was by them that the ancients turned from the path of generation, destruction, and change in general. It would have been enough for them to look at this nature for all their ignorance to dissipate.
Chapter 9
There are others who have perceived it, although not sufficiently. Because they continue to think that something can only come to be from what it is not , and that this nature is only one in potential, which is something completely different from what we have been saying. We affirm that matter and privation are different: the former is not by accident and the latter is not by itself. They, instead, affirm that the Great and the Small are not , taken together or each separately. His triad is thus entirely different from ours.
In a certain sense matter is destroyed and generated, in another not. Because, considered as that "in which", it destroys itself; but considered as power, it is not destroyed in itself, but is necessarily indestructible and ingenerable. As for the principle according to form, it is proper to first philosophy to deal with it; and as for the natural forms that can be destroyed we will talk about them later. In this way it is therefore determined that there are principles, what they are and how many they are in number.
Topics
- The science of nature: starting point and method.
- Number and nature of the principles. The Parmenides and Melissus thesis .
- Refutation of the thesis « what is, is one»
Four. Physicists' theses and their examination - Nature of the principles: the opposites
- Number of principles: two or three
- Nature and number of principles from the analysis of becoming
- Resolution of the aporias of the ancient philosophers
- Reflections on matter as a principle: Plato's critique
Aristotle: Physics II
(Resume)
Juan Pablo Cotrina Cosar
(Origin Group - UNMSM)
Chapter 1
Some things, like animals, plants, and simple bodies, are by nature ; others, like a bed, a piece of clothing, or any art product, are due to other causes. The difference is that the former have in themselves a principle of movement and rest; while the latter only have it accidentally . Because nature is a principle and cause of movement or rest in the thing by itself , not by accident , since the thing that is by accident does not have in itself the principle of its production, but some have them outside, and others have it in themselves , but not by themselves.
Now, each one of those things that has in itself the principle of its production has a nature. Furthermore, it is a substance , since it is a substratum and nature is always in a substratum. But, those things that do not have in themselves such a principle are only by nature and according to nature.
Thus, it is said what nature is and what it is to be by nature and according to nature. And, although it would be ridiculous to demonstrate the existence of nature, it is necessary to explain the meanings that it has.
On the one hand, some think that the nature or substance of things that are by nature is the first constituent in each of them, something formless in itself; thus, the nature of the bed would be wood. With this, they consider matter as the nature of things, hence some think that nature is fire; others, the earth; others, the air; others, water; others, that several of these elements; others, than all of them. But, on the other hand, some think that the nature of things is the form or the species , since the form would have in itself the principle of movement and, furthermore, because we say that a thing is what it is when it currently exists more than when it exists in power. In this way, nature is said in two senses: matter and form.
Episode 2
According to the senses of nature, matter and form, a difference is established between the work of the physicist and that of the mathematician. But if there are two natures, which is to be studied by the physicist? Or will he have to study rather what results from both? But if you have to study what results from both, then also each of them. In this case, will there be the same science for both natures, or rather a science for one and another for the other?
If we attend to the ancients it could It seems that the object of physics is matter . But, if "art imitates nature" and it is proper to the same science to know the form and the matter (for example, the builder knows the form of the house, but also the matter, namely, bricks and wood ), it will then be the proper task of philosophy to know both natures. In addition, it is also typical of this science, philosophy, to know the for which or the end and everything that is in function of that end. That is to say, it is characteristic of philosophy to know nature, since it is an end and that for which.
The arts, on the other hand, also produce, dominate, and, above all, know matter. These are divided into two large groups: some know the subject and know how to use things; and others, which are called architectural and belong to the productive arts, know the form. Thus, in artificial things we produce matter to operate with it, but in natural things matter already exists. In addition, matter is something relative, since one matter is required for one form and another matter for another form. Now, to what extent must the physicist know the form and essence of things? Must he know them by limiting himself to his own end, and to what is separable as regards form, but which is found in the same matter? As for determining the mode of being of what is separable and what its essence is, this is typical of first philosophy.
Chapter 3
Now, having made these distinctions, it is necessary to examine which and how many are the causes, since the object of this investigation is the know and we do not believe we know something if we have not first asked why, that is , the first cause .
In the first place, it is said that the cause is that internal constituent or matter of which something is made, like bronze with respect to the statue. Secondly, the form or model is said to be the cause , that is, the definition of the essence and its kinds, and the parts of the definition, such as humanity with respect to man. In the third place, the first principle from which the change or rest comes is said to be the cause , like the father with respect to the son. And, lastly, it is said that the end is the cause, that is, that for which something is, like health with respect to walking, since why do we walk? To be healthy.
Such, then, are the senses in which something is said to be a cause. But as cause is said in several senses, it happens that the same thing has several causes. Causes that are reduced to four classes: those that are the underlying subject ; those that are essence ; those that are principle of change and rest ; and those that are the end or the good of things. These causes, whether proper or accidental, can be said or potentially or in act; thus, the cause of the construction of a house is the builder, and of the house that is actually being built, it is the builder who is building it. For all these reasons, it must be said that when investigating the cause of each thing, always look for the one that is preponderant.
Chapter 4
It is often said that luck and chance are also causes. Thus, it is necessary to examine, first, how luck and chance are among the indicated causes; second, whether luck and chance are the same or different; and, third, what they are.
On the one hand, some think that nothing comes from luck, since everything that happens has a specific cause. For if luck were anything, it seems strange that none of the ancient sages have dealt with it, though they have made use of it, like Empedocles. But it is also surprising that many things come to be and are due to luck or chance. On the other hand, others consider this world and all worlds to be the product of chance; for they say, absurd as it may be, that heaven and divine things have been generated by chance. More, along with these, there are those who think that luck is a cause, but that it is something divine and so demonic that it makes it inscrutable for human thought. In this way, it is necessary to examine causality and luck and see what each one is of them.
Chapter 5
Having considered the different opinions regarding luck and chance, it is now necessary to examine what each is.
always happen in the same way, and others in the majority of cases . For this reason, it is evident that none of them can be said to be caused by luck or that they happen by chance. But since, apart from these, there are others that everyone says happen by chance, it is evident that luck and chance are something.
Now, there are things that happen for something , others not. Among the things that happen for something, some happen by choice, some don't. Well, it is “for something” that which is done as an effect of thought or of nature . But, we say that something is by accident when it is due to luck. Because just as a thing is by itself or by accident, so can a cause.
Thus, what is cause by itself is determined , but the accidental cause is indeterminate , and luck being an accidental cause, it is therefore necessarily indeterminate. Hence it is thought to be inscrutable to man. But it is also correct to say that luck is unpredictable , since we can only foresee what happens always or almost always, while luck occurs outside of these cases. It is for this last reason that luck is fickle , especially what is called "good luck."
Chapter 6
Having stated, in the previous point, that luck and chance are accidental causes, it is now necessary to examine how they differ from one another.
Chance differs from luck by being a broader notion , since everything that is due to chance is also due to chance, but not everything that is due to chance is due to luck. Luck, for its part, differs from chance by limiting itself to human activity . Therefore, nothing done by inanimate things, animals and children is the result of luck. Chance, on the other hand, can be found in other animals and in many inanimate things. Thus, when something other than its purpose happens to things due to an external cause, we say that it is by chance and, when it comes to things that can be chosen by those who have the ability to choose, we say that it is by chance. But, chance differs from luck especially in things generated by nature, since when something contrary to nature is generated we do not say that it is by chance but by chance.
In this way, it has been said what chance is, what luck is and how they differ. As for the way in which they are causes, they are both causes as that from which motion begins. But since chance and chance are causes of things that have been accidentally caused by something, and since nothing accidental is prior to what it is by itself, it is evident that no accidental cause is prior to any cause by itself. Chance and luck are, then, subsequent to intelligence and nature.
Chapter 7
There are several ways in which we can understand the why of things. The why , in effect, ultimately refers us either to the essence, or to what primarily makes us move , or to what for, or to matter. Thus, there are four causes, and it is the task of the physicist to know them all, because to physically explain why he will have to refer to all of them, that is, to matter, to form, to what makes move, and finally . In general, it is the task of the physicist to inquire about things that are moved by moving others. But, as for those that move without being moved, it is not the province of physics, since they do not move because they possess movement or the principle of movement, but because they are immobile. In this way, the principles that move are two. And one is not physical, because one does not have in oneself the principle of movement. Thus, since nature is for something, it is necessary to explain this cause as well.
Chapter 8
We have to explain, at this point, first, why nature is included among the things that are for something; then, to say in what way the necessity appears in natural things, since all refer to this cause, although as soon as they admit it they abandon it by appealing to chance. Thus, since things are thought to happen either by coincidence or for a purpose, and since it is not possible for them to happen by coincidence or due to chance, it is necessary, then, that they happen for a purpose. Therefore in things that come to be and are by nature there is a final cause. For things are made the way their nature intended them to be made. That is, they are made for something.
Now, in some cases art completes what nature could not complete, in others it imitates nature. Therefore if the things produced by art are made with a view to an end, it is evident that so are those produced by nature; for the former refers to what is later in both natural and artificial things. And since nature can be understood as matter and form, and since the latter is the end, while everything else is a function of the end, the form has to be cause as final cause.
We also observe that in what is done artificially, errors occur. Therefore it is evident that these errors can occur in natural things. Well, if there are artificial things in which what has been produced has been done correctly with a view to an end, and also others made erroneously when the intended end has not been achieved, the same can happen in natural things, an example of this are the monsters. In addition, we must say that natural things are those that, moved by an internal principle, reach an end, but this end is not the same for each beginning, nor is any end fortuitously reached from a certain beginning, but from the same beginning comes to the same end, if nothing prevents it. Thus, it is evident that nature is a cause that works for an end.
Chapter 9
What is by necessity, is it in a conditional or absolute sense? Some believe that what is by necessity resides in the generation, as if they thought that a wall was made by the matter of which it is constituted. However, although the wall cannot be made without those things, it was not made because of them, but was made for something. Therefore, what is necessary is conditionally necessary, but not as an end; because the necessity is in the matter, while the end is in the definition. Thus, it is evident that in natural things what is necessary is what we call matter and its movements. In this way, the physicist has to establish both causes, but above all the final cause, since this is the cause of matter and not the matter of the end.
Topics
- Nature: what is nature and what is by nature or according to nature .
- The senses of nature: matter and form.
- Science and types of art.
- The four causes.
- Luck and chance
a) The accidental cause: indeterminate, inscrutable, unpredictable and inconstant.
b) Luck (human activity) and chance (animals and inanimate things). - “The why” and the four causes.
- The principles of movement: “those who move and are moved” and “the immobile”.
- The form as final cause.
- Matter as a conditional necessity.
Aristotle: Physics IV
(Resume)
Martin Rosado Osorio
(Origin Group - UNMSM)
Chapter 1
We must study whether the place is or is not, how it is and what it is. Everyone admits that things are somewhere and the most common and main movement called displacement is a movement with respect to the place; but what is the place presents difficulties since our predecessors did not deal with it and its difficulties. It is evident that the place exists through the substitution of bodies, but the place itself is different from the body. Thus the place and the space are different from the bodies that are exchanged in them. The displacement of simple bodies, like fire, shows that the place is not only something but that it exerts a certain power because each one of these bodies is taken to its own place. Mathematical objects , although they do not exist anywhere, nevertheless have a right and a left due to their position with respect to us, so that they only conceptually and not by nature have such directions.
Those who support the existence of the place in turn support the existence of the void, since the void would be a place devoid of a body. Now if the place exists then what is it . We must determine the proper gender of the place. The following aporias are proposed: 1) the place has three dimensions (length, width and depth) and is not just another body; 2) the limits of the body and its surfaces also have a place; but the point is not different from the place of the point and so with respect to the other things and therefore the place will not be something that is outside of them either; 3) So what is the place? It is not an element nor is it made up of elements, it has a certain magnitude, but it is not a body; 4) Furthermore, the place is the cause of what things? No mode of the four causes can be attributed to it; 5) and if it were something existing in itself, where is it then? If everything exists in a place, then the place must also exist in a place and so on ad infinitum. Zeno's aporia deserves an answer; 6) If everything is in one place and every place has a body, what happens to things that increase? The place should increase with them if we assume that the place of each thing is neither greater nor less than it.
Therefore, a double problem arises: what is the place and if it really exists.
Episode 2
The place is that common in which all the bodies are or that immediately where each particular body is. If the place is what immediately contains a body, then it would be a certain limit with which it would be the shape of each body by which it is determined. the magnitude of its matter insofar as the form is the limit of each body; thus the place of a body is its form. On the other hand, the place seems to be the extension of the magnitude with which it is matter insofar as the extension is different from the magnitude
However, the place cannot be neither form nor matter, since these are inseparable from the body, while the place can be. Then the place seems to be similar to a container but different from its content. The place thus has to be something, but difficulties arise regarding its what it is (essence).
Chapter 3
Let us examine whether it is possible for a thing to be in itself or not to be in any case, since every thing is either nowhere or in something else. The question is ambiguous because being in oneself is understood in two ways: with respect to oneself or with respect to another . For example, if something is part of a whole then it is in itself, but strictly speaking it is not possible for the separate part of the whole to be in itself. For this reason, only when the thing has parts is it possible to affirm that it is in itself .
If we examine the question inductively and by argument we will see that nothing is in itself in the senses distinguished above. Each part of the whole is different from each other; otherwise, two things would be in the same thing, but it turns out that the ratio of what is in something is different from the ratio of that in which it is .
The impossibility of a thing being in itself in the primary sense of " being in" is manifest. In addition, Zeno's aporia is not difficult to resolve: nothing prevents the primary place of one thing from being in another thing, not as in another place , but as health is in hot things, that is, as a state or condition. This avoids proceeding to infinity.
Then it is evident, following the example of the container, that the place is not part of what is contained in it, since "what" and "in what" are different, and place is neither matter nor form but something else. These are difficulties with respect to the place.
Chapter 4
First of all, it is evident that no investigation of the place would have arisen if there had been no movement relative to the place; of this movement one class is the displacement, another the increase and decrease, because in these there are changes. In turn, among the things that move, some are act by themselves, others only accidentally, and what is moved by accident either does it by itself as the part of the whole (or the nail of a ship), or it does it by accident, like whiteness, which changes places if that to which it belongs changes. Furthermore, we say that a thing is in the universe as in a place, that is, in the place of the air, but we do not say that it is in all the air. When what contains it is not divided from the thing but in continuity with it, it is said that the thing is not in a place but as part of the whole; but when the thing is divided and in contact with another thing , then both contiguous ends by contact are equal because they occupy the same place. And if a body is in continuity with the body that contains it, then it moves with it , but if it is separated from it , it moves in it .
From the above it is considered what the place is; it must be one of these four things: either form, or matter, or a certain extension that is between the extremes, or the extremes of the surfaces of the bodies in contact. But three of these are inadmissible . The place is different from the form since the form is the limit of the body as content and the place is the limit of the body as a container. Then, the place is not a certain extension since an extended space is not possible apart from the content of the body that occupies it, since it would suppose that there are infinite places in the extended place supposedly existing by itself. Nor is the place matter because the place is separable (as a possibility, though not in fact) from the thing and contains it while matter does not have these properties. If it is none of these three, then it will have to be the limit of the containing body that is in contact with the contained body, like the containing vessel with respect to the contained wine.
The place seems to be something important but difficult to capture, since it seems to be matter, form or extension. The example of the container shows that the place, like the container, would be transportable, but the place is a non-transferable container, as in the case of the boat in the middle of the river, but the place would be the total river because the totality is immobile. The place wants to be immobile; therefore, the place of a thing is the first immobile limit of what contains it. Therefore, the center of the universe and its limits, as extreme points of location, are at rest. The place seems to be a surface like a still container that contains and is next to a thing, since the limit is together with the limited.
Chapter 5
The whole of the universe is in one sense in motion, in another it is not. As a totality, it does not simultaneously change places, but moves in a circular motion. Thus some of its parts do not move up or down but in a circle, but others do so by rarefaction and condensation. Some parts are in one place but others are not. The bodies with local movement are in a place, but the sky, as a whole, is not in a where , since there is no body that contains it; but its parts do have a place. Other things are accidentally in one place, like the sky and the soul, because the parts of the sky are in one place but not the whole of the sky. That is why all things are in the sky and perhaps the sky is everything, because beyond it there is nothing else and it is not in anything else.
According to the above, the aporias are resolved: a) there is no need for the place to increase with the body; b) nor that a point has a place; c) nor that two bodies are in the same place; d) nor that it is corporeal extension because the limit, concept that defines the place, is not the same as the extension, being this the whole of the body and the limit the end of it; e) the place is in a where , but not as the place is in another place, but as the limit is in the limited, since not everything has a place but only mobiles; f) each body moves to its own place; and, g) it is reasonable that the thing remains in its proper place as the part remains in the place of the whole.
Chapter 6
It is also up to the physicist to reflect on the void, whether or not it is, how it is, and what it is. Those who defend its existence conceive it as a certain place or container that is full when it receives content and empty when it is deprived of it. Those who refute its existence claim that air is something and not empty, that is, air has resistance if it is compressed into skins. But ordinary people hold that a vacuum is not a body and there is nothing in it, not even air. They would have to be shown that the void is not a separable extension of bodies, as Democritus, Leucippus and others affirm.
Chapter 7
Let's see the meanings of the empty name: it is thought to be the place where there is nothing. Thus the body is something and occupies a place, but if the place is not occupied then it is empty, and emptiness is thus non-corporeal and therefore lacking in heaviness or lightness. Then, it seems that what is not filled by some body that can be touched is called empty, but what happens if what is extensive has color or sound, not perceptible by touch? If it receives a tangible body then it is empty, otherwise not. It is also called emptiness that which lacks a this or corporeal substance. That is why they compare it with matter.
In truth, there is no emptiness, neither separable nor non-separable from things.
Chapter 8
The void cannot be the cause of the movements, because in the void there are no differences. Therefore, there is no place to which the bodies can move, that is, both natural and violent movements would be impossible.
Chapter 9
If the vacuum existed, it would not explain all movements. Furthermore, the void would be something and would occupy a place. And if it moved, it would have to move into a void. All of which is impossible.
Chapter 10
We must inquire whether time is or is not and then what its nature is. It is not totally or it is in an obscure and difficult way to grasp it is deduced from what follows. Time is thought to be a certain movement and a certain change, but there is only movement and change in the thing that changes while time, on the contrary, is everywhere and with everything. Furthermore, time is neither fast nor slow as change is, and time is not defined by time as slow and fast are.
Chapter 11
Without change there is no time, because when we do not change we do not notice that time has passed according to a before and after. Thus, there would be no time if the now were not different; time, although it is not movement, does not exist without it. Therefore the starting point is: what is time with respect to movement.
Time is not movement but something belonging to it. In movement, a before and an after are distinguished, by analogy with magnitude, and thus a before and an after are also distinguished in time, since time follows movement. Therefore, before and after time exist in movement, but their being is different from movement, even though we know time when we determine movement, and perceiving before and after in determined movement, we say that time has elapsed. And before and after are distinguishable because they are different as extremes from the middle, and only when the soul distinguishes a now before and a now after then does time exist. Time is the number of movement according to before and after, that is, time is not movement but is perceived from movement. Thus, if the movement is always different, then so is the time, but the simultaneous time is the same. But the now is perceived as a unit and not as before or after, and then it seems that no time has elapsed in the now, since it is only said that there is time when we perceive a before and an after.
With respect to now it is said in two senses: it is the same and it is different . As soon as it is a now and then another now is different; but as soon as the now itself is identical, since the now by nature is always the intermediate between before and after. If time follows movement, then the now follows the thing in motion, since through the displaced thing we know the before and after, and through these we in turn know the now. Therefore, if there were no time (before and after) there would be no now, and if there were no now there would be no time. Time is continuous through the now and is divided into the now insofar as the latter is the dividing line between before and after; however, as a limit, the now is not part of time, but, insofar as it allows us to distinguish (number) time, it is a number.
Chapter 12
Time is simultaneously the same everywhere, but different insofar as it is before and after time. On the other hand, we not only measure movement by time but the other way around, since both delimit each other.
Time is the measure of movement and of the thing that is moving and it measures it insofar as movement is “ being in time”, but “being in time” means: 1) being when time is; 2) be an integral part of time as when we say that something is owned by something else. Before and after are part of time in the second sense, and things are in time in the first sense, that is, they are in time but do not belong to it. And to say “being in time” supposes, first, admitting a greater time in which all things are. Second, it supposes being affected by time and thus it is said that time is what deteriorates things: only things that exist in time are destroyed, those that remain forever are not in time and therefore are not destroyed. Third, what is not is not in time either. And finally, time itself is a measure of movement and indirectly it is a measure of things in motion.
Chapter 13
Let's review the meanings of now. First, it is a limit in a double sense: as long as it divides, it is always different, but as long as it unites the past and the future, it is the same as the mathematical lines; second, it means proximity as when saying "will come now"; Third, it is the end and the beginning, not of the same time, but of the end of what has passed and the beginning of what is to come, and it is always beginning and therefore it is inexhaustible, but in it all things are extinguished and destroyed. Time is rather a cause of destruction than of generation
Chapter 14
All change and all things moved are in time. But worthy of study is the way in which time is related to the soul. If there were no soul to number, there would be nothing to be numbered; without the intelligence of the soul there is no time unless there is something when there is time. On the other hand, time is the same, although the movements in time are different. Now, if what can be counted is measured by what is numbered in so far as it is congener to it, then circular motion is the measure par excellence because it is uniform and for this reason, in turn, time is thought to be the motion of the sphere, by which other movements are measured and time itself is measured by this circular movement.
Topics
- The place
- The Void
- The weather
a) Time is a measure of movement.
b) The before and after. He is now limit and not part of time.
c) Time is the same and different.
d) Meanings of being in time .
e) Time and soul.
#theplace
#thevoid
#wheather
#soulandtime
#movement
#thetime