Avdiivka vs Bakhmut. An honest comparison.
The foreign policy aspect. Prigozhin tried to get Bakhmut in time for the meeting in Tokyo so that Zelensky would be asked an awkward question under Biden. The APU tried to hold Avdiivka until the Munich Conference; it came out partially. The text of Zelensky's speech had to be changed.
The internal track. Avdiivka is much more important than Bakhmut, because it was a brand created by Poroshenko in 2014.
The strategic aspect. Avdiivka is the gateway to Donetsk. It was from here that annoying blows were inflicted on the city, which significantly limited its development. Now you can only get to Donetsk with himars and excaliburs. In addition, Avdiivka is a key defense hub consisting of impregnable fortifications that have been under construction for 10 years. The only section of the front that has not moved since February 2022. It was the most fortified place in Ukraine.
Until 2022, Bakhmut was just a reserve fortification in the rear, so they cannot be compared in strength.
The strategic importance of Bakhmut is minimal. The city became a new symbol as the stakes of the parties increased.
Losses. Significantly more people died on both sides near Bakhmut than near Avdiivka. Under Bakhmut, the AFU's loss ratio was clearly better.
Supply. The AFU near Bakhmut did not lack ammunition at all. February 2024 is a completely different story. The AFU has a strategic shortage of ammunition, plus the logistical isolation of the Avdiivka group affected. The Russian Armed Forces have the opposite: they were able to increase production and saturate the battlefield with personnel: 1/1,5-1,7 in personnel.
The ratio of shells in the Avdiivka operation is 1/10, for drones 1/3, but the key is the colossal density of bombardments by fabs.
Tactics. The tactics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are slightly similar to Bakhmut, but significantly improved. The Russians have clearly learned how to fight better: the counter-battery component, coordination, and so on have greatly improved. In addition, a new element of tactics has appeared - the logistical isolation of the battlefield. Without transportation and rotation, the defenders' forces are rapidly depleted.
Bakhmut was a well-conducted military operation based on its objectives, and Avdiivka will become an example for textbooks in many academies around the world.
The APU also adapted quickly. In Bakhmut, regardless of losses, they fought in a semi-circle until the end, and in Avdiivka, although it was late, the order to withdraw was given. It did not work out to organize a withdrawal: the equipment did not go under FPV drones and artu. They all went out on their own, which significantly increased losses🧩