Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

In 1947, as the Truman administration gave up hope of reaching an acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union to create a government in Korea, they turned to the United Nations. The purpose of this approach was to increase the chances that Korean leaders in the South could resist Soviet domination. It was clear that a separate government would be created in the southern zone, and if that government were recognized as legitimate by the international community, it would be politically stronger. Secondly, it would be easier for the Truman administration to persuade Congress to provide significant economic aid to Seoul.

US officials believed that international condemnation of Soviet pressure on Iran in 1946 had contributed to Moscow’s withdrawal from that border state. Some optimistically concluded that the same outcome might happen in Korea, if UN member states were unanimous and firm in support of free elections in Korea. The Soviets might then back down, and in any case, the US could demonstrate its commitment to international cooperation and to fulfilling its obligations.

Thus, after Foreign Minister Molotov rejected the latest American proposal, Undersecretary Lovett informed Moscow on September 16 that the US would place the Korean issue on the UN agenda the following day. Speaking to the General Assembly, Secretary of State Marshall declared that the main reason for the impasse over Korea was Moscow’s refusal to accept the principle of freedom of expression for Korean political leaders. Since the two occupying powers had been unable to carry out their agreements on Korea, Marshall asked for international action to remove the danger to world peace represented by the situation in Korea.

The State Department’s plan was that the UN would supervise elections for a constituent assembly to be held within six months. This legislature would then formulate a constitution and appoint officials for a provisional government. The plan also called for the creation of a “United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea” (UNTCOK), made up of representatives from eleven countries, which would supervise the elections and report to the General Assembly on how fairly they were conducted.

For the US, changing conditions in China added urgency to the proposal for Korea. In the summer of 1947 military forces of the Chinese Communist Party won significant victories over the Nationalists. If Communists came to power in China, American officials reasoned, US occupation forces in Korea would be in danger, and perhaps American control of Japan would be threatened. To prepare a strategy for coping with these threats, President Truman sent Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China and Korea to examine the “political, economic, psychological, and military situations.”

The Wedemeyer mission was also driven by concerns over Europe. The Truman administration feared that the strong “China Lobby” in Congress might block US assistance to Greece and Turkey and funds for the European Recovery Program in order to reserve resources for supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Truman therefore hoped Wedemeyer could persuade Chiang to carry out the military, economic, and political reforms that appeared necessary to defeat the Communists.

In the next post we will examine Wedemeyer’s important report and its impact on American policy toward Korea.

[Sources: This post relies on William Stueck, The Wedemeyer Mission: American Politics and Foreign Policy During the Cold War (University of Georgia Press, 1984); and James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press).]